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NOTES
REGULATED INDUSTRIES-STATUTORY CONSTRUCfION OF
SECfION 541(a) OF THE CABLE TELEVISION CONSUMER PROTEC
TION AND COMPETITION ACf OF 1992: A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR
OF PRACfICAL REASON
INTRODUCfION
During the 1970s, cable television providers and policymakers
generally perceived the developing cable television industry to be a
natural monopoly, analogous to a public utility.1 As a result, mu
nicipal authorities typically granted exclusive franchises to cable
providers. 2 Consistent with the traditional treatment of public utili
ties, the cable industry was regulated by both the Federal Commu
nications Commission (FCC) and state and local governments to
counter the absence of competition faced by these exclusive
franchises. 3 Thus, regulation displaced competition while similarly
protecting consumer interests. The public utility model of cable
regulation changed, however, in 1984 when Congress essentially
deregulated the cable industry for the purpose of promoting the in
dustry'S growth. 4 The deregulation of the cable industry left a large
number of cable providers operating under existing exclusive
franchise agreements. These cable providers were in effect left in
control of unregulated monopolies. By the 1990s, Congress had
concluded that the market power exercised by cable franchises was
no longer benign and was actually injuring consumer interests. s
In 1992, Congress responded to these conditions in the cable
industry with the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Com
petition Act of 1992 (the "Act").6 Congress designed the Act to
1. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
3. See infra part 1.A.2.
4. See infra part 1.A.3.
5. S. REp. No. 92, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1143.
6. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 102 Stat. 1374 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.c.).
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promote consumer interests, in part by facilitating managed compe
tition in the cable industry. Accordingly, section 541(a) of the Act
prohibits cable franchising authorities, typically local governments,
from granting exclusive franchises 7 and from "unreasonably" refus
ing to grant subsequent franchises. 8 Unfortunately, section 541(a)
of the Act does not explain whether it is "unreasonable" for a
franchising authority to refuse to grant a second franchise to "" cable
provider on the grounds that the authority has already granted an
exclusive franchise. In other words, Congress failed to expressly
state whether section 541(a) may be applied retroactively to negate
the exclusivity of preexisting franchises.
Two federal courts of appeals have reached opposite conclu
sions on this issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, in Cox Cable Communications, Inc. v. United
States,9 decided that section 541(a) required negation of the exclu
sivity provision of a preexisting franchise when a qualified second
franchisee applied for a franchise. The United States Court of Ap
peals for the Sixth Circuit, in James Cable Partners v. City ofJames
town,to disagreed with Cox. The court in James Cable based its
opinion primarily on Landgraf v. USI Film Products,u an employ
ment discrimination case decided by the Supreme Court after Cox,
that established a test for whether a statute applies retroactively.
Relying on Landgraf, the court in James Cable held that section
541(a) does not negate the exclusivity of preexisting franchise
agreements. 12 In reaching this conclusion, the court interpreted the
statute in light of the Landgraf presumption against retroactivity.13
This Note asserts that the Cox court essentially reached the
correct result in holding that section 541(a) may negate the exclu
sivity of preexisting franchise agreements when a qualified appli
cant applies for a second franchise.1 4 It criticizes the use of the
Landgraf test as applied to the cable situation for being too narrow
7. In the cable industry, an exclusive franchise is an agreement by which a cable
provider is licensed by a state or local government to be the only provider of cable
television services within the prescribed area.
8. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a} (1994). The effect of a second franchise would mean that an
additional cable provider would offer cable services to the consumers in the prescribed
area. See infra note 69 for the text of § 541(a}(1}.
9. 992 F.2d 1178 (11th Cir. 1993).
10. 43 F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 1995).
11. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994). See discussion infra part II.
12. James Cable, 43 F.3d at 279.
13. Id.
14. Cox Cable Communications, Inc. v. United States, 992 F.2d 1178, 1194 (11th
Cir. 1993).

1996]

A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF PRACTICAL REASON

439

in scope and conclusory in analysis, and for basing its reasoning on
a limited determination of congressional intent. As a consequence,
the test fails to accurately discern whether applying a presumption
against retroactivity to section 541(a) is correct under the circum
stances, 'given the objectives of the legislation. This Note asserts
that the Landgraf test for retroactivity is essentially the Supreme
Court's method of justifying post hoc the Court's decision that was
actually based on other reasons. The Note proposes an alternative
method of determining retroactivity, based on "practical reason."
It argues that this approach is more consistent with the actual judi
cial decision-making process; and is better suited to reaching an in
terpretation of the statute that comports with the objectives of the
legislation. This Note concludes that, in light of the purpose of the
1992 Cable Act, as illustrated by the text and legislative history, the
characteristics of the cable industry, and the effect of the 1984 Act
on the industry, section 541(a) presumptively applies to preexisting
exclusive franchises. In light of this presumption, whether the ex
clusivity of a particular franchise should be protected is determined
on a case-by-case basis.
Part I of this Note provides' a brief overview of the growth of
the cable industry, the role of government in the industry, and a
summary of the legislative history of the 1992 Cable Act. Part II
discusses the Landgraf test for retroactivity. Part III examines the
Cox and James Cable opinions and compares their reasoning to the
Landgraf standard. Part IV explores the shortcomings of the Lan
dgraf test for determining retroactivity, and proposes an alternative
"practical reason" based method. Part V analyzes section 541(a)
under the method proposed in Part IV.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Factors Leading to the Enactment of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992

Regardless of whether cable television in fact possessed attrib
utes of a natural monopoly, the cable industry developed in the
form of a natural monopoly because government and cable firms
perceived it as such, and therefore shaped it in that form. As a
result, cable providers were granted exclusive franchises. Because
competitive forces that typically protect consumer interests were
thereby eliminated, these exclusive franchises were subjected to
regulation. By the 1980s, the aggregate burden of regulation by lo
cal, state and federal governments had become an impediment to
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the growth of the cable industry. Congress responded in 1984 with
legislation that essentially deregulated the cable industry. How
ever, cable providers retained their exclusive franchises. By the
1990s, policy makers, as well as consumers, perceived the market
power possessed by the cable industry to be responsible for nega
tive effects on consumer interests. In addition, observers began to
question whether the cable television industry was indeed a natural
monopoly. In 1992, Congress enacted legislation designed to ad
vance consumer interests by facilitating managed competition in the
cable industry.
1.

Growth of the Cable Industry as a Natural Monopoly

Both cable providers and local and state governments per
ceived the cable television industry from its inception to exhibit
characteristics of a natural monopoly. IS Local and state govern
ments maintained that cable installation was disruptive to the com
munity.16 They also asserted that the economies of scale in the
cable industry were such that, even if cable providers were permit
ted to compete, only one provider would remain in the market in
the long run,17 It was further posited that cable television was a
"capital intensive" industry, due to the large initial investment re
quired to construct a "cable grid."18 Advocates of the natural mo
nopoly theory therefore maintained that the exclusive franchise
model was the most efficient means of structuring the cable indus
15. Daniel L. Brenner, Was Cable Television a Monopoly?, 42 FED. COMM. L.J.
365 (1990). A "natural monopoly" is an industry where: (1) one firm can meet the
demand in the market at a cost less than if multiple firms were to produce the same
quantity; (2) the industry is "capital intensive," meaning that the initial cost for entering
the market as a producer is high; and (3) the industry exhibits "economies of scale,"
meaning that once the fixed cost of market entry is expended, the average cost of each
unit of output decreases as more units are produced, providing a compelling incentive
for the provider to expand market share. Commentators posited that the economies of
scale in the cable industry would, if competition were attempted, invariably result in a
single cable provider remaining. Donald L. Bell, Unbundling: An Alternative to the
Current System of Cable Television Franchising, 21 CUMBo L. REV. 43, 63-65 (1990).
While it is debatable whether cable actually was a "natural monopoly" similar to a
public utility, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An
Economic Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U: PA. L. REv. 1335 (1986),
the fact that it was treated as such dramatically influenced the development of the in
dustry. Brenner, supra, at 369.
16. Hazlett, supra note IS, at 1345.
17. Hazlett, supra note IS, at 1348-49. On this assumption, it is in the public
interest to grant an exclusive franchise, thus obviating a wasteful and disruptive period
of competition.
18. Bell, supra note IS, at 64-65. A "cable grid" is essentially the physical cable
system installed in a city.
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try. Thus, the perception that the cable industry was a natural mo
nopoly served as a rationale for local and state governments to
grant exclusive franchises. 19 In turn, the grant of exclusivity created
a correlative justification for regulating the franchises. 20
Proponents of the natural monopoly theory asserted that econ
omies of scale existed in the cable industry.21 Purportedly, any
initial competition in a given cable franchise area would lead inexo
rably to a single remaining provider. Under this theory, where sev
eral cable providers have made the initial investment of installing a
cable grid in a particular location, the costs of adding each addi
tional subscriber and therefore lowering the average costs and in
creasing the profit margin, would be minimal. Thus, the incentive
to acquire all potential additional customers would be substantial.
Consequently, through competition, the most efficient provider
would inevitably capture the entire market. As this process was
deemed inherently wasteful, exclusive franchising seemed to be a
plausible alternative.22
The enormous expense of installing a cable grid23 further en
couraged the granting of exclusive franchises. Exclusivity protected
smaller, financially weaker cable providers from the threat of larger
cable companies "overbuilding"24 the smaller company's system
and then competing. The "superior financial position" of larger
companies "would insulate them from what might otherwise be se
rious losses. Such firms would be willing to forego short term prof
19. Hazlett, supra note 15, at 1345. See also Jay Lee Kanzler, Jr., Getting the
Picture on Cable Franchise Monopolies, 47 J. Mo. B. 53, 55 (1991). In addition, "[b]y
limiting the number of cable franchises, the local governments are said to serve the
purposes of '(1) preserving public streets and sidewalks for their intended uses, (2)
preventing deterioration of aesthetic qualities of the community's environment, and (3)
obtaining the best cable television system for those who subscribe.'" Id. (quoting
GEORGE H. SHAPIRO ET AL., 'CABLE SPEECH': THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PRO·
TECfION 173 (1983».
20. Traditionally, the problem of natural monopoly has been addressed by price
regulation. The firm is permitted to exclusively serve the market, protected from po
tential competition. In the absence of competition as a means of ensuring fair pricing,
government regulation is imposed. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POL·
ICY: THE LAW OF CoMPETITION AND ITS PRACfICE 34 (1994).
21. Hazlett, supra note 15, at 1348-49 (quoting Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City
of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.».
22. Id.
23. Bell, supra note 15, at 64-65. See also Michael I. Meyerson, The First Amend
ment and the Cable Television Operator: An Unprotective Shield Against Public Access
Requirements, 4 COMM. & ENT. LJ. 1 (1982).
24. "Overbuild" simply means to build an additional cable grid in an area already
served by a cable system.
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its, even sustaining losses, to obtain a monopoly. "25 Thus, exclusive
franchises were granted for periods of several years to protect cable
operators from competition so they could recoup their initial capital
mvestment.26
Consistent with the perception that cable was a natural monop
oly, cable franchisors invariably granted exclusive franchises (ex
press or in fact)27 to cable providers. 28 Congress has acknowledged
that exclusive franchises were incident to the initial development of
the cable industry, finding competition to be absent "[f]or a variety
of reasons, including local franchising requirements and the ex
traordinary expense of constructing more than one cable television
system to serve a particular geographic area. "29
2.

Regulation of Cable Television

The perception that cable was a natural monopoly and the ex
clusive franchising that resulted from that perception provided the
impetus for the regulation of the industry.3D Classical economic
theory teaches that competition regulates market participants' eco
nomic behavior so that firms will be forced to provide goods and
services at reasonable costS.31 Because the dynamics of a natural
monopoly eventually result in the elimination of competition, gov
ernment regulation is thought to be "necessary to protect the con
sumer from exploitation."32 Therefore, exclusive franchising in the
cable industry necessitated government regulation.
Cable franchising authorities possessed three means of regula
tory power over cable providers. First, cable franchise rates were
regulated. 33 Until 1984, cities clearly exercised power over cable
television rates for "basic service," within guidelines set by the
25. Bell, supra note IS, at 7l.
26. MORTON I. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE: LEGAL AND BUSINESS ASPECfS
OF CABLE AND PAY TELEVISION § 4.02[2], at 4-18 (rev. ed. 1996).
27. Some states have not recognized municipalities' authority to grant exclusive
cable franchises, while others only nominally permit the exclusive grant. Regardless,
the exclusivity of franchises was accepted and adhered to by the industry and the gov
ernment. See Brenner, supra note 15, at 371.
28. Id. at 410.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (1994).
30. Brenner, supra note 15, at 396. See also HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, at 34.
31. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO 1HE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Bruce Mazlish ed., 1961).
32. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579,596 (1976).
33. Brenner, supra note IS, at 397.
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FCC. 34 Second, in exchange for a noncompetitive market, cable
operators were required to pay "franchise fees" to the regulatory
authority.35 Essentially, franchise fees were annual charges im
posed on the cable providers by local or state governments in ex
change for the privilege of using the public rights of way.36
Franchise fees quickly became the subject of competitive bidding by
potential cable providers. 37 In response, the FCC limited the
amount that municipalities could charge in franchise fees. 38 How
ever, the bidding process for franchises continued, with in-kind
competitive bids39 offered by cable providers in·exchange for exclu
sive franchises. 40 Third, cable franchising authorities had the power
to determine whether a particular franchise would be renewed at
the end of its duration. For municipalities, the renewal process was
a source of leverage that could be· used to obtain improved service
from the cable provider.41
Until 1984, no uniform standards existed regarding the regula
tion of cable television. 42 During the 1970s, regulatory power oscil
lated between the states and the FCC. While regulatory power was
exercised concurrently by local and state governments and the
FCC,43 by 1974 it was clear that the FCC maintained preemptive
authority over the states in cable regulation. 44 Cable operators crit
icized this dual regulation as a source of contradiction as well as an
impediment to the development of the industry.45
34. Id. at 398. "Basic service" means the lowest minimum cable services that a
subscriber may purchase.
35. Id. at 399.
36. Michael I. Meyerson, The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984: A Bal
ancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REv. 543, 555 (1985).
37. Brenner, supra note 15, at 399.
38. Robert F. Copple, Cable Television and the Allocation of Regulatory Power: A
Study of Governmental Demarcation and Roles, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 1,32 (1991).
39. "In-kind" bids tendered by franchise applicants have included such promises
as planting 20,000 trees in the city. See Kanzler, supra note 19, at 56.
40. Id. at 55-56. The FCC imposed a fee ceiling on in-kind payments as well. See
Meyerson, supra note 36, at 555.
41. See HAMBURG, supra note 26, § 4.04, at 4-54.
42. S. REp. No. 92, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1134.
43. David W. Arnesen & Marlin BHzinsky, Cable Television: Will Federal Regula
tion Protect the Public Interest?, 32 AM. Bus. L.J ..627, 630-31 (1995).
44. Copple, supra note 38, at 27-28. The FCC was initially reluctant to regulate
the cable industry because it was unclear as to whether it had the authority to do so. [d.
at 17-22.
45. See Arnesen & Blizinsky, supra note 43, at 631.
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The 1984 Cable Act

The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 was enacted in
response to intensive pressures from the cable industry and local
governments to establish a national regulatory policy for cable tele
vision. 46 Congress intended the 1984 Cable Act to· facilitate growth
and development in the cable industry by minimizing the economic
burdens of perceived unnecessary regulation, thus promoting com
petition. 47 The 1984 Act established guidelines for the regulation of
several aspects of the cable industry including rates, franchise fees,
and franchise renewals. 48 The 1984 Cable Act prohibited rate regu
lation where a cable operator faced "effective competition," which
resulted in rate deregulation for approximately 97% of the cable
industry.49 Franchise fees were limited to a maximum of 5% of the
gross yearly revenue of the cable system. 50 Finally, the 1984 Cable
•Act created a "strong presumption in favor of franchise renewal at
the end of the franchise term."51 In sum, the 1984 Act severely
curtailed the means of control traditionally exercised by franchising
authorities over cable providers.
46. Nicholas P. Miller et aI., The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 and
Franchising Renewals, in CABLE TELEVISION LAW 1989: DEALING WITH THE LAW
CHALLENGES, at 9 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. 267, 1989). See also Thmer Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 819 F.
Supp. 32, 53 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
47. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, In the Matter of Competition, Rate
Deregulation and the Commission's Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable Television
Service, 5 F.C.C.R. 362 (1989) [hereinafter Competition]. While the 1984 cable legisla
tion ostensibly was designed to promote competition, the Act in fact blocked one of the
greatest potential sources for competition: The entry of telephone companies into the
cable industry. Alan F. Ciamporcero, Telephone Company Provision of Cable Televi
sion Service 1991, in CABLE TELEVISION LAW 1992: CABLE FACES CONGRESS, THE
COURTS, AND COMPETITION, at 9 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3877, 1992). The 1984 Act codified earlier
FCC restrictions on cross-ownership between telephone and cable companies operating
in the same area, purportedly to prevent telephone companies that already controlled
telephone pole and conduit space required for the installation of cable, from concen
trating control of markets. Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, modified, 22
F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), affd, General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir.
1971). The exclusion of telephone companies from the cable industry is beyond the
scope of this Note.
48. S. REp. No. 92, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N at 1134-35.
49. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N at 1136. The FCC's first standards for
determining whether a cable system faced effective competition were based on whether
subscribers could receive three over-the-air local television signals. Id. Cable systems
serving subscribers in an area deemed to face effective competition were not subject to
rate regulation. See Copple,supra note 38, at 66-68.
50. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1994).
..
51. Brenner, supra note 15, at 404-05.
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Effects of the 1984 Act

These changes in regulation served as catalysts for growth in
the cable industry. By 1992, cable service was available to over
90% of the homes in the country. Viewers had an average of thirty
six channels to choose from and a 50% increase in programming
choices. 52 In the words of the FCC, "there' can be no doubt that the
cable industry has prospered under the Cable Act" of 1984.53
While the 1984 Act was successful in promoting industry
growth, it was unsuccessful in promoting cOPlpetition. 54 The Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reported
that cable providers serving local communities invariably enjoyed a
monopoly.55 The monopoly status was problematic in light of the
fact that the 1984 Cable Act greatly diminished the local and state
government's means of regulating the cable providers by circum
scribing rate regulation, limiting franchise fees, and creating a pre
sumption in favor of franchise renewa1. 56 By 1992, Congress
recognized that "the cable industry now possesses undue market
power which is used to the detriment of consumers, programmers,
and competing video distributors. "57
The obvious result of exclusive franchises is that consumers in
the franchise area have no choice among cable providers. In the
absence of regulation, the exclusive franchisee is at liberty to ex
tract higher fees from consumers, and provide fewer services of
poorer quality than those providers faced with competition. 58 This
52. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N at 1135.
53. Competition, supra note 47, at 362.
54. See generally Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable Act: Just the Beginning, 15
HAST. COMM. & ENT. L.J. 305 (1993).
55. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 5, at 8, reprinted in 199:2 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1143.
56. Brenner, supra note 15, at 404-05.
57. S. REp. No. 92, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1135.
58. The nature of the monopoly possessed by most cable systems was summarized
in the Commerce Committee's report:
The value of a cable franchise follows from the protection from competition
that it provides the holder. Since the holder of the franchise will have a mo
nopoly, the prospective cable operator would be able to generate a cash How
that would result in a supernormal return on investment in assets other than
the franchise. . .. [B]ecause the franchise limits the customers to a single
provider in the market, other "customer oriented" intangibles relating to the
expectation of future patronage do not exist for a cable system. There is a
goodwill in a monopoly. Customers return, not because of any sense of satis
faction with the monopolist, but rather because they have no other choices.
S. REP. No. 92, supra note 5, at 9, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1143 (quoting from
the reply brief in Telecommunications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 36 (1990)).
For an argument that goodwill may coexist with monopoly in the cable industry,
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unprotected status of consumer interests was exacerbated by a dif
ference of opinion between the FCC and the Department of Justice
during the 1980s. While the FCC deregulated rates under the 1984
Act, the Department of Justice determined that cable was a natural
monopoly and thus immune from federal antitrust liability.59 The
result was that municipalities could "determine that a single cable
firm will best serve its citizens," but were powerless to "limit the
welfare loss arising from monopoly pricing."60 Thus, neither rate
regulation nor antitrust liability were applied by the federal govern
ment to the cable industry.61
The pervasiveness of essentially unregulated franchise monop
olies in the cable industry was suspected of generating adverse mar
ket results. 62 Congress observed that in the wake of the 1984 Act,
average monthly cable rates nearly tripled. 63 The Senate Com
see Joshua G. Genser, The Economic Case for the Coexistence of Monopoly Power and
Goodwill in the Cab,e Television Industry, 16 HAST. COMM. & ENT. L.J. 265 (1994).
59. Glenn B. Manishin, Antitrust and Regulation in Cable Television: Federal Pol
icy at War With Itself, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 75, 77-78 (1987). State and local
governments could exercise power to grant exclusive franchises, thus creating localized
monopoly power in the cable industry, under "State Action Immunity." The United
States Supreme Court held, in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), that states may
impose anticompetitive restraints in the exercise of their sovereign powers, immune
from federal antitrust liability. The "State Action Immunity" doctrine was extended in
City of Lafeyette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), where the Court
held that a municipality may impose anticompetitive restraints pursuant to a state pol
icy to displace competition with monopoly public service or regulation. The Court cir
cumscribed the "State Action Immunity" doctrine somewhat in California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), holding that the
state policy relied on by a municipality or local government should be clearly articu
lated and expressed. The Midcal :holding was applied in Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), where the Court held that an anticompetitive
cable ordinance enacted by a city pursuant to the municipality's "Home Rule" authority
did not automatically fall under the "State Action" exemption from Sherman Act liabil
ity, because the ordinance was found not to further or implement an affirmatively ex
pressed or clearly articulated state policy. Id. at 55.
60. See Manishin, supra note 59, at 90. The effectiveness of antitrust law was
further diminished when, in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Community
Communications, 455 U.S. 40 (holding that municipalities are not automatically pro
tected by "State Action Immunity" from antitrust liability), Congress enacted the "Lo
cal Government Antitrust Act of 1984," barring recovery of money damages against
local governments or employees for antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1994).
61. See Manishin, supra note 59, at 76. See also Albert K. Smiley, Regulation and
Competition in Cable Television, 7. YALE J. ON REG. 121, 121 (1990).
62. See Kanzler, supra note 19, at 54. "The controversy surrounding cable televi
sion is a direct result of two forces: exclusive franchises awarded by municipalities, and,
deregulation under the 1984 Act. The effect has been a continued increase in consumer
prices and increased company values." Id.
63. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(I) (1994).
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merce Committee found that, in the handful of communities64
where two competing cable systems operated, rates were "approxi
mately 20 percent lower and the per-channel prices [were] as much
as 50 percent lower than in communities with only one cable sys
tem."65 The Committee also found that the absence of competition
in the cable industry was responsible for "abominable" customer
service. 66
5. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992
In response to the imbalance of market power in the cable
market, the 1992 Cable Act was intended to "ensure that cable tele
vision operators do not have undue market power."67 In part, Con
gress attempted to effectuate this policy through the promotion of
managed competition. 68 Section 541(a), which prohibits municipal
ities from granting exclusive franchises and encourages granting
second franchises, was one of the mechanisms created to promote
managed competition. 69
Congress began investigating apparent problems within the
cable industry in 1989 when the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation initiated hearings on competition
problems in the cable industry.7° On November 15, 1989, Senator
64. SEN. REp. No. 92, supra note 5, at 13, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1146.
Out of 11,000 cable systems, there were only 53 communities where competition was
present or possible. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1135.
67. 47 U.S.C. § 521(b)(5) (1994).
68. While the 1992 Act speaks of promoting competition in the cable industry, it
is more accurate to describe the legislative objective as that of "managed competi
tion"-a regulated competitive market. One chief criticism of the Act voiced at the
time of enactment was that the legislation effectively imposed regulation, while pur
porting to promote competition. S. REp. No. 92, supra note 5, at 94-97, reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1227-30. Indeed, the Act imposed significant regulatory measures
over the cable industry, in contrast to the 1984 cable legislation. Id. However, the
stated objective of the 1992 Act was to promote competition by controlling the major
impediment to competitive cable markets-"undue market power." Id. at 1, reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1133-34. Thus the 1992 Act regulatory measures designed to
deter monopolistic behavior were perceived as a prerequisite to facilitating competitive
cable markets.
69. Section 541(a)(1) states in pertinent part that "[a] franchising authority may
award, in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter, 1 or more franchises within
its jurisdiction; except that a franchising authority may not grant an exclusive franchise
and may not unreasonably refuse to award an additional competitive franchise." 47
U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994).
70. S. REp. No. 92, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1135. By
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Danforth introduced S. 1880, the predecessor to the bill that would
become the 1992 Cable Act. 71 The version of Senator Danforth's
bill that emerged from committee included a provision encouraging
local franchising authorities to award second franchises. 72 The
committee amendment provision stated that franchising authorities
were prohibited from granting exclusive franchises and from
"unreasonably refus[ing] to award an additional competitive
franchise."73 Section 541(a) was silent on the question of whether it
applied to preexisting exclusive franchises.1 4
Other provisions in the Act aimed to increase competition as .
well. Section 541(f) mandated that no provision of the Act be con
strued to impede a local government's ability to operate a
franchise.1 5 This section was designed to support municipalities
seeking to provide cable services in competition with private cable
providers. Again, the law contained no statement specifying what
effect this provision had on preexisting exclusive franchises.
Section 548 deals with problems of unfair competition marked
by exclusive contracts between video programmers and providers. 76
Like section 541(a), section 548(c)(2)(D) generally prohibits exclu
sive contracts that are not in the public interest,77 However, in con
trast to sections 541(a) and 541(f), Congress specified this
provision's retroactive scope, exempting satellite cable contracts enthe time of passage of the 1992 Act, the Senate Commerce Committee and Communi
cations Subcommittee had held over 20 such hearings. Allard, supra note 54, at 309-11.
71. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 5, at 62, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1195.
On June 7, 1990, S. 1880 was reported favorably by the Senate Commerce Committee,
adopting an amendment in the nature of a substitute. In January, 1991, Senator Dan
forth reintroduced the bill as S. 12. The Committee reported S. 12 favorably on May 14,
1991, again adopting an amendment in the nature of a substitute.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 91, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1224.
74. At least one commentator has interpreted this provision to apply to preexist
ing franchises. See Kathy L. Cooper, Comment, The Cable Industry; Regulation Revis
ited in the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,1 COMM.
L. CONSPEcruS 109, 123 (1993).
75. The provision states that "[n]o provision of this chapter shall be construed to
... prohibit a local or municipal authority that is also, or is affiliated with, a franchising
authority from operating as a multichannel video programming distributor in the
franchise area, notwithstanding the granting of one or more franchises by such franchis
ing authority." 47 U.S.c. § 541(f) (1994).
76. § 548.
77. § 548(c)(2)(D). Section 548(c)(4) stipulates that determinations as to whether
exclusive contracts serve the "public interest" must consider the effects on competition,
the attraction of capital investment, the effect on the diversity of programming, and the
duration of the contract. Id.
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tered into prior to June 1, 1990.78
The bill was vetoed by President Bush on October 3, 1992.79
On October 5, 1992, the Senate voted seventy-four to twenty-five to
override the president's veto.80 The House voted to override the
veto by a similar margin, 308 to 114, on the same day.81 Thus, on
October 5, 1992, Congress enacted the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992. 82
In sum, the 1992 Act was designed to protect consumers from
the market power exercised by cable providers in the wake of the
1984 deregulation of the cable industry. The Act impliedly chal
lenged the status of cable as a "natural monopoly" by seeking to
effectuate managed competition as the means of protecting con
sumer interests, primarily by prohibiting exclusive franchises. Con
gress failed, however, to specify what effect the new legislation
would have on preexisting exclusive franchises.
II.

RETROACfIVITY ANALYSIS-THE LANDGRAF STANDARD

In the absence of any statement as to the effect of the new
legislation on preexisting exclusive franchises, the issue was left to
the courts. Both the Cox and James Cable courts framed the issue
of whether section 541 (a) applied to preexisting exclusive franchises
in terms of whether the statute may operate retroactively.83 In
Landgraf v. US! Film Products ,84 decided after Cox, the Supreme
Court promulgated its most recent test for determining whether a
statute may apply retroactively.85 Because the issue in Cox and
78. § 548(h)(l).
79. Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, II PuB. PAPERS: George Bush 1751
(Oct. 3, 1992). President Bush criticized the bill; preferring that less regulation be
imposed.
80. 138 CONGo REC. S16,676 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
81. 138 CoNG. REc. Hll,487-88 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
82. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 102 Stat. 1374 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
83. See infra part III. For a complete history of the development of the presump
tion against retroactivity, see Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legisla
tion: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936). See also Ray H.
Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 540
(1956).
84. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
85. The issue in Landgraf was whether § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), ap
plied to a case of sexual harassment that was pending when the legislation passed. The
petitioner had filed a sexual harassment claim that was dismissed pursuant to a bench
trial, finding that her employment was not terminated in violation of TItle VII. The
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James Cable concerned retroactivity, the Landgraf test is the appli

cable law by which the courts' analyses are measured. 86
The test prescribed by Landgraf for determining whether a
statute operates retroactively begins first with the threshold inquiry
of whether Congress had expressly stated the statute's scope. 87
Where this is the case, no further analysis is required as to the ret
roactivity of the statute since Congress's intent is clear.88 However,
if
the statute contains no such express command, the court must
determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect,
i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he
acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new
duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the stat
ute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption
teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent
favoring such a result. 89

Thus, the Court established a two part analysis governing judicial
determinations of a statute's temporal scope absent an express conCivil Rights Act of 1991, which authorized recovery of damages and entitlement to a
jury trial, was signed into law while the petitioner's appeal was pending. The peti
tioner's argument that her case should be remanded for a jury trial on damages pursu
ant to the 1991 Civil Rights Act was rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. The ~upreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision and held
that § 102 did not apply to the petitioner's case. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1488-89. 1508.
For discussion of the Landgraf opinion, see KeIli D. Taylor, Comment, The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 and Retroactivity: Do Landgraf v. USI Film Products and Rivers v. Road
way Express, Inc. Signify a New Era of Restrictive Employment Discrimination Cases?,
17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 773 (1994); Janine M. Weaver, Note, Reconciling the Irrecon
cilable: Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1061 (1995).
86. Note that the Landgraf opinion was decided after Cox but prior to James
Cable.
87. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1505.
88. However, constitutional challenges in the form of Due Process may still exist.
Id. at 1497.
89. Id. at 1505. As noted at note 92, infra, Justice Scalia fundamentally disagrees
with the majority's use of congressional intent for determining a statute's retroactivity.
Notably, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun adhered to a vested rights
analysis and reached the conclusion that § 102 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act applies
retroactively. See infra note 147 for a discussion of the vested rights analysis. He rea
soned that as a piece of remedial legislation, § 102 "does not proscribe any conduct that
was previously legal." Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1509 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). One
commentator has noted that the Landgraf majority and dissent, using similar analyses
but reaching opposite conclusions, indicates the confusion that wiII likely be exper
ienced by lower courts in applying the vested rights standard. Leonard Charles
Presberg, Comment, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Retroactivity, and Continuing Viola
tions: The Effect of Landgraf v. USI Film Products and Rivers v. Roadway Express, 28
U. RICH. L. REv. 1363, 1369 (1994).
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gressional directive. 90 The court must (1) determine whether the
statute would have "retroactive. effect,"91 and if so, (2) discern
whether there is "clear congressional intent"92 that the statute so
operate.
III.

PRINCIPAL CASES

The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits reached opposite conclusions
on the issue of whether section 541(a) should apply retroactively.
The court in James Cable stated that the Landgraf decision, ren
dered after Cox, dispositively decided that the provision should not
apply retroactively. The James Cable court therefore maintained
that the Cox decision was erroneous in light of Landgraf.

90. The Landgraf opinion reconciles a longstanding tension between two lines of
reasoning, one represented by Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1973),
which held that a court must "apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,"
and the other represented by Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.~ 488 U.S. 204. 208
(1988), which held that statutes will not be interpreted "to have retroactive effect unless
their language requires this result." Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1496. The Court expressly
stated that Bradley did not alter and was not inconsistent with the presumption against
retroactivity. The holding in Landgraf reconciled the cases by mandating that, where a
statute is retroactive in effect, the presumption against retroactivity applies unless there
is clear congressional intent to the contrary. Id. at 1505. Thus, the "law in effect" ap
plies in light of the presumption against retroactivity absent clear congressional intent.
91. The Court determines whether a statute has "retroactive effect" based on a
two-factor analysis. The Court examines whether the statute interferes with a right typi
cally afforded protection from the retroactive application of a statute. Rights are thus
classified into categories of those which are protected, substantive, "vested rights," such
as contract rights, and those which are unprotected, as is the case with statutes effecting
procedural or jurisdictional changes. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1500-02. The Court also
considers equitable notions of "fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expecta
tions." Id. at 1499. See infra part IV.
92. The Court discerned congressional intent by looking at the text and legislative
history of the statute. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the majority,
stating his agreement that "clear congressional intent" is required, but that such intent
can only be found by a "clear statement." Id. at 1522 (Scalia, J., concurring). He at
tacked the majority's inquiry into the legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
stating that "[t]his effectively converts the 'clear statement' rule into a 'discernible legis
lative intent' rule." Id. The tension between the majority and concurring opinions in
Landgraf over what factors to consider in evaluating Congress's intent reflects a long
standing debate about the appropriate role of legislative history in statutory interpreta
tion. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 624
(1990). Justice Scalia's approach to statutory construction is guided by the position that
"once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative
history becomes irrelevant." Id. at 623.
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COX Cable Communications, Inc. v. United States93
1.

Facts

In 1983, the ten-year exclusive franchise agreement for the pro
vision of cable television services between Cox Cable Communica
tions and Robins Air Force Base (hereafter "Air Force") expired. 94
The Air Force subsequently sought bids for a new contract and
awarded a ten year exclusive franchise to Centerville, Georgia. 95
Claiming that its First and Fifth Amendment rights had been in
fringed 96 and asserting a right to renewal pursuant to the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984,97 Cox Cable filed suit. 98 A
preliminary injunction was granted, prohibiting the Air Force from
excluding Cox Cable from the base and mandating that Cox Cable
be permitted to provide cable services alongside Centerville. 99
Centerville intervened in the suit, focusing on the potential detri
mental effects a settlement between Cox Cable and the Air Force
could have on its exclusive franchise with the latter party.lOO
The Air Force elected to settle with Cox Cable,1Ol and did not
oppose Cox Cable's motion for summary judgment on the First
Amendment claim.102 Centerville filed a cross-motion in opposi
tion to summary judgment for both the First and Fifth Amendment
claims asserted by Cox Cable. lo3 The district court granted Center
ville's motion on the Fifth Amendment claim, granted Cox Cable's
motion on the First Amendment claim, and converted the prelimi
nary injunction against the Air Force into a permanent injunc
tion.1 04 Centerville appealed. After the filing of briefs, but before
oral argument, the 1992 Cable Act went into effect.lo5
93.

992 F.2d 1178 (11th Cir. 1993).
94. Id. at 1180.
95. Id. 47 U.S.c. § 541(f) enables municipalities to provide cable services.
96. See infra part V.A.3 and infra note 271 for a limited discussion of how these
amendments apply.
97. 47 U.S.c. §§ 521-559 (1994).
98. Cox, 992 F.2d at 1180.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. It is not clear what the nature of the settlement was from the Court of Ap
peals opinion.
102. Cox, 992 F.2d at 1180.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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2. Court of Appeals Opinion
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
first determined that the Air Force was indeed a "franchising au
thority" subject to the 1992 Cable Act.1 06 The court then consid
ered what impact the Act had on Centerville's existing exclusive'
franchise agreement. The court stated that "[t]he Cable Competi
tion Act does not automatically invalidate existing exclusive
franchises; rather, it invalidates the exclusivity of [exclusive]
franchises when a qualified applicant requests access to the market
serviced by those franchises."107 The court reasoned that "[g]iven
that the award of exclusive franchises is prohibited by the first
clause of the Act[,] . . . refusal to award an additional franchise
solely because of the existence of an exclusive franchise with an
other party would be an 'unreasonable refusal' under the Act. "108
The Cox court reasoned that its holding effectuated the intent of
Congress, finding that "[w]hile Congress could have chosen [not to
affect preexisting franchises], we conclude from the text of the Act
that it did not do SO."109 The Cox court based its conclusion on its
reading of the Act's text, and the conclusion that an exclusively pro
spective reading of section 541(a) would mean that "full and uni
form application of the Act could not occur until after the
expiration of all existing franchises."llo
Finally, the court expressed no opinion on Centerville's claims
that the Act was unconstitutional on Due Process grounds. Instead,
it remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dis
miss the case if the Act was found unconstitutiona1. 1l1
B.

James Cable Partners v. City of Jamestown 112
1.

Facts

In 1977, the city of Jamestown, Tennessee, granted a cable tele
106. Id. at 1181. Because the Air Force settled with Cox Cable, the question
arose as to whether Centerville, as an intervenor, had legal standing to continue on
appeal. Id. at 1180. The determination of this question was contingent on whether
Centerville suffered an injury caused by Cox Cable, which itself turned on the question
of whether the exclusivity provision of the franchise between the Air Force and Center
ville was valid. Id. at 1181-82..
107. Id. at 1181.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1182.
110. Id. at 1181-82.
111. Id. at 1182.
112. 43 F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 1995).
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vision franchise for the duration of twenty-five years to Fentress
County Cable Vision. 113 Pursuant to a memorandum agreement
approved by the city of Jamestown, Fentress County Cable assigned
the franchise to James Cable Partners in 1988. In January 1990,
Jamestown granted to itself a franchise to operate a cable television
system and proceeded to install and operate a parallel or "over
built" cable system in competition with James Cable. James Cable
promptly filed suit in a state chancery court seeking a declaratory
judgment that the exclusivity provision of their franchise had been
breached by Jamestown. 114 The chancery court denied James
Cable's request, but this denial was reversed by the Tennessee
Court of Appeals.1 15 The city's request for review by the Tennessee
Supreme Court was denied. In January 1992, the chancery court
enjoined Jamestown from operating its competing cable system.1 16
On October 5, 1992, Congress enacted the 1992 Cable ACt. I17
In November 1992, James Cable filed suit in federal district court to
obtain a declaration that retroactive application of the 1992 Cable
Act would result in an unconstitutional taking of its property, and
that the Act did not invalidate its exclusive franchise agreement. 118
Jamestown counterclaimed, arguing that all preexisting exclusive
franchises were invalidated under the 1992 Cable Act. 119 On April
7, 1993, the district court enjoined Jamestown from competing with
James Cable and from taking any action that violated James Cable's
exclusive franchise agreement, including granting any other
franchise. 120
2.

Court of Appeals Opinion

The court in James Cable held that section 541(a) did not apply
to preexisting franchises. In so doing, it relied on the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Landgraf v. USI Film Products I21 for
its analysis and reasoning. Beginning with the premise ~hat "[t]he
law does not favor retroactivity,"I22 the court delineated that a pre
113. Id. at 278.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra part I.A.5.
118. James Cable, 43 F.3d at 278.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
122. James Cable, 43 F.3d at 279 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488
U.S. 204,208 (1988».
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sumption against retroactivity applies when construing a statute
that lacks "strong and imperative "language" requiring retroactive
effect. 123 The court disagreed with the holding in Cox, reasoning
that Landgraf rejected inferring retroactive application of a statute
from ambiguous and indirect language. 124 The court concluded that
"[n]othing in the language of section [541(a)] compels retroactive
application."125 In interpreting the section 541(a) prohibition
against "unreasonably refus[ing] to grant additional competitive
franchises,"126 the court concluded that "the existence of an exclu
sive franchise is an eminently 'reasonable' ground to refuse to
award an additional franchise."127
The court then addressed Jamestown's argument that, if sec
tion 541(a) were interpreted to apply prospectively only and pro
hibit the city from operating a cable franchise, it would violate
section 541(f). Section 541(f) forbids an interpretation of any other
section of the Act that prohibits a local or municipal authority from
operating a cable system regardless of the existence of other
franchises previously granted by the authority.128 Thus, Jamestown
argued that an exclusively prospective interpretation of section
541(a) would violate section 541(f). The court disagreed, holding
that "[i]t is the exclusive franchise that Jamestown previously
granted James Cable that prohibits Jamestown from providing cable
service, not any provision of the Act. "129
The court stated that new statutory provisions involving con
tractual rights represented the "largest category of cases in which
. . . the presumption against retroactivity" had been applied.130
Next, the court rejected Jamestown's contention that the confer
ence committee's statement that "exclusive franchises are directly
123. Id. (citing Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1499-1500).
124. Id. at 280 (citing Landgraf, 114 S. Q. at 1495).
125. Id.
126. 47 U.S.c. § 541(a) (1994).
127. James Cable, 43 F.3d at 280.
128. Section 541(f) provides:
No proviSion of this chapter shall be construed to
(1) prohibit a local or municipal authority that is also, or is affiliated with, a
franchising authority from operating as a multichannel videoprogramming dis
tributor in the franchise area, notwithstanding the granting of one or more
franchises by such franchising authority; or
(2) require such local or municipal authority to secure a franchise to operate
as a multichannel videoprogramming distributor.
§ 541(f).
129. James Cable, 43 F.3d at 280.
130. Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1500 (1994».
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contrary to federal policy and to the purposes of the [1992 Cable
Act]" required retroactive application. 131 Relying on Landgraf, the
court "reject[ed] the idea that furthering the purpose of the statute
can be a valid reason to apply it retroactively."132

c.

o

Cox and James Cable's Application of the Landgraf Test

Cox was decided prior to Landgraf and therefore could not
have relied on the test formulated by the Supreme Court. The
court in Cox did not explicitly address the first part of the Landgraf
test, whether the 1992 Cable Act was retroactive in effect. The Cox
court simply determined that the intent of Congress was made
abundantly clear by the text. 133
Conversely, the court in James Cable briefly analyzed whether
the Act was retroactive in effect. Relying on a classification scheme
delineated in Landgraf, the court reasoned that because the exclu
sivity of a franchise agreement is contractual, it belongs to the cate
gory of cases in which the Supreme Court has traditionally applied
the presumption against retroactivity.134 Thus the court failed to
explicitly address equitable considerations germane to exclusivity
and based its determination on the legal conclusion that exclusivity
is contractual. 135
Landgraf requires that, where a statute is retroactive in effect,
the presumption against retroactivity governs absent clear congres
sional intent as evidenced by the text and legislative history.136
Therefore, under Landgraf, a determination that section 541(a) op
erates retroactively requires an analysis of legislative intent.
Neither opinion adequately addresses the question of legislative in
tent in light of Landgraf.
Other than its reading of the text of the Act, the Cox court
offered no other authority for holding that section 541(a) applies to
preexisting exclusive agreements. The Cox court reasoned exclu
sively from the text that if section 541(a) were not applied retroac
tively, uniform application of the Act would not occur until all
131. Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REp. No. 862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1992), re
printed in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1231, 1259).
132. Id.
133. Cox Cable Communications, Inc. v. United States, 992 F.2d 1178, 1182 (11th
Cir. 1993).
134. James Cable, 43 F.3d at 280 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct.
at 1500).
135. Id.
136. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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existing exclusive franchise agreements expired. 137 In Landgraf,
the Court relied on legislative history when the text provided no
clear directive. Section 541(a) contains no statement concerning its
temporal scope and gives no indication of whether the existence of
a preexisting exclusive franchise is a reasonable basis to refuse to
grant a second franchise. In the absence of any clear text on the
issue, it would have been improper under Landgraf for the Cox
court to conclude its analysis without considering legislative history.
The court in James Cable considered the question of legislative
intent more carefully. After stating that the language of the statute
was ambiguous, the court dismissed an argument based on the legis
lative history, relying on Landgraf to support its conclusion that
"furthering the purpose of the statute" is not a valid reason for ap
plying it retroactively.138
The Sixth Circuit in James Cable misinterpreted the reasoning
in Landgraf. In response to arguments on behalf of the plaintiff,
the Court in Landgraf stated that furthering the purpose of a stat
ute is not sufficient to rebut the presumption against retroactive ap
plication. 139 However, the Court expressed that the real reason for
denying retroactive application was because the statutory provision
at issue was "plainly not the sort of provision that must be under
stood to operate retroactively because a contrary reading would
render it ineffective."14o The court in James Cable ignored this rea
soning in Landgraf. On the contrary, the reasoning in Cox parallels
the Supreme Court in that Cox held retroactive application appro
priate because otherwise the statute would not be fully applied. 141
In addition, the Sixth Circuit in James Cable failed to recognize
an important distinction between the legislative histories of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 involved in Landgraf and the 1992 Cable
Act. The Court in Landgraf noted that the 1991 version of the Civil
Rights Act represented a compromise version of the legislation. 142
In 1990, the President vetoed the bill, in part due to the unfairness
of the bill's retroactivity provisions. 143 The 1991 version of the bill
that Congress enacted omitted the retroactivity provisions of the
137. Cox, 992 F.2d at 1181·82.
138. James Cable, 43 F.3d at 280.
139. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1507-08 (1994).
140. Id. at 1508.
141. Cox, 992 F.2d at 1182.
142. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1492.
143. Id.
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1990 bill.1 44 In light of the other relevant legislative history, the
Court in Landgraf concluded that this omission of retroactive lan
guage demonstrated that Congress "agreed to disagree" about ret
roactive application. 145 There is no comparable legislative history
of the Cable Act that indicates a similar political comprornise. 146
Thus, neither the Cox nor the James Cable courts adequately
applied the Landgraf test. The court in Cox neither explained
whether the statute was retroactive in effect, nor clarified the mean
ing of the ambiguous text of section 541(a) with an analysis of legis
lative intent. The court in James Cable mechanically categorized
the exclusivity interest as a contract right and thereby concluded
that the presumption against retroactivity should. apply. James
Cable, however, provided little explanation of the legislative intent
of Congress concerning retroactivity. Both courts mechanically in
terpreted the statute without giving consideration to factors such as
the legislative history of the Act, the particular circumstances of the
cable industry, or how retroactive application of the provision
would affect the underlying interests of the parties.
IV.

PROBLEMS WITH LANDGRAF'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
METHOD AND THE ALTERNATIVE OF
PRACTICAL REASON

The James Cable court's reliance on Landgraf to reach its con
clusion raises the question of whether the Landgraf test itself is suf~
ficient to resolve the retroactivity issue. This Note asserts that,
even if the court in James Cable had correctly applied the Landgraf
test, the Supreme Court's framework is inadequate for judicial anal
ysis of retroactivity in the current context.
A. A Critique of Landgraf's Retroactivity Analysis
Both prongs of the Landgraf test are problematic. In the first
prong, whether the statute has "retroactive effect," the Court relies
on difficult categorical distinctions while simultaneously purporting
to address the equities of the case. This test results in confusing
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1496.
146. In the President's veto message regarding the Cable Act, he made no men
tion of unfair retroactivity provisions as a basis for his veto. Message to the Senate
Returning Without Approval the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi
tion Act of 1992, II Pus. PAPERS: George Bush 1751 (Oct. 3, 1992). Moreover, Con
gress overrode the veto. Therefore, only one version of the statute was ever passed by
Congress.
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distinctions. The second prong, whether Congress intended the
statute to apply retroactively, presumes that Congress may have a
single, discernible intent.
1.

Whether the Statute is Retroactive in Effect

In Landgraf, the Court analyzed whether the statute had retro
active effect by determining whether the interest effected by the
new legislation was one typically protected by the Court from the
retroactive application of legislation. Interests traditionally af
forded protection were those involving "vested rights."147 Thus, the
Court engaged in drawing categorical distinctions between those in
terests that qualify as "vested rights," such as contract rights,148 and
those that do not. The Court cautioned, however, that determining
whether a statute operates retroactively is not a simple or mechani
cal task.149 The test is "whether the new provision attaches new
legal consequences to events completed before its enactment."150
At least one commentator criticized the reasoning in Landgraf
147. The Court quoted the definition of retroactive legislation offered by Justice
Story in Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767
(C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156): "[E]very statute, which takes away or impairs vested
rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or
attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must
be deemed retrospective." Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1499.
The Court's reliance on the tenn "vested rights" contributes to the confusion in its
retroactivity analysis. A vested right is a right which has "so completely and definitely
accrued to or settled in a person that they are not subject to be defeated or canceled by
the act of any other private person, and ... the government should recognize and pro
tect [the right as] settled according to the then current rules of law." BLACK'S LAW
DlcrIONARY 1654 (6th ed. 1990). The conceptual problem of vested rights in the con
text of a discussion of retroactivity is that "[t]here is no such thing as a law that does not
extinguish rights, powers, privileges, or immunities acquired under previously existing
laws." Bryant Smith, Note, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEX. L. REv. 231, 233
(1927). Indeed, all laws change to some extent rights and duties that preceded the law.
148. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1500.
149. Id. While the Court recognized that it is not practical "to classify the enor
mous variety of legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity," several general catego
ries were mentioned. Id. at 1499. The largest category of cases in which a presumption
against retroactivity was applied were those involving contract and property rights, as
those cases tended to be ones where "predictability and stability are of prime impor
tance." Id. at 1500. However, where prospective relief, jurisdiction, or procedural rules
are at issue, no presumption against retroactivity is applied. Id. at 1501-02. For an
example of prospective relief escaping the presumption, the Court cited American Steel
Foundries v. Tri·City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921), where § 20 of the Clay
ton Act, passed while the underlying action was pending appeal, was applicable to de·
tennining the propriety of injunctive relief against labor picketing. The Court held that
"relief by injunction operates in futuro." Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1501 (quoting Ameri
can Steel, 257 U.S. at 201).
150. Id. at 1499.
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for relying on "conclusory legal terms" instead of analyzing the im
pact that the decision would have on the rights of the parties. 151 As
a consequence of relying on legal cla~sifications, the test formulated
in Landgraf "neglect[ed] to examine the equities" involved in a par
ticular case. 152
The Landgraf opinion, however, did purport to require more
than a "mechanical" categorization of the interest affected. The
Court stated that the question of retroactivity is a question of law,
where judges must consider the "nature and extent" of the new
provision and its relation to the past events, guided by "familiar
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expec
tations."153 The Court's statements in regard to notice, reliance, ex
pectations, and fairness indicate that some balancing of the equities
should be involved in determining retroactivity. Unfortunately,
Landgraf did not specify how these equitable considerations are to
be implemented in conjunction with the "vested rights" classifica
tion approach.
The Landgraf test for determining whether a statute is retroac
tive in effect resulted in a confusing distinction in examining the
retroactivity of the compensatory damages provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.154 The Court reasoned that recovery of statuto
rily authorized compensatory damages for discrimination that pre
ceded the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would be retroactive in effect
because compensatory damages are "quintessentially backward
looking," and would affect the liabilities of defendants for past be
havior. 155 In effect, the Court categorized the interest effected by
151. Presberg, supra note 89, at 1367-68.
152. Id. at 1396. Critics of the vested rights approach tend to suggest that greater
clarity in analysis and greater fairness in result could be achieved if courts were ex
pressly directed to base their analyses less on whether the right affected is vested or not
vested, substantive or procedural, and more on the equities and policy considerations
involved in each individual case. Determining whether a statute should be applied ret
roactively should be accomplished by "following precedent where there is a precedent,
and deciding the novel cases as considerations of policy, justice, and equity may re
quire." See Smith, supra note 147, at 247.
The vested rights approach also has been criticized as a static rule that forecloses
discussion of important elements of statutory interpretation, such as legislative objec
tives and the relative strength of rights affected. See Greenblatt, supra note 83, at 561.
See also Presberg, supra note 89, at 1403 (stating that any categorical vested rights
analysis undermines issues of fairness and reliance in individual cases).
153. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1499.
154. Id. at 1503. The ambiguity of this distinction was noted by Justice Scalia in
his concurring opinion. Id. at 1525.
155. Id. at 1506.
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compensatory damages as a vested right.156
The Court distinguished the case of compensatory damages
from its holding in a prior decision regarding attorney's fees. 157 The
Court permitted recovery of statutorily authorized attorney's fees
in a school desegregation case where the authorizing statute was
enacted while the litigation was pending in Bradley v. Richmond
School Board .158 According to the Court in Landgraf, the pre
sumption against retroactivity did not apply to attorney's fees in
Bradley because they are "collateral to the main cause of action."159
The Landgraf Court also noted equitable considerations at play in
Bradley that justified retroactive application,160
The majority in Landgraf reasoned that "compensatory dam
ages may be intended less to sanction wrongdoers than to make vic
tims whole, but they do so by a mechanism that affects the liabilities
of defendants."161 It is unclear how attorney's fees in school deseg
regation cases substantially differ. The purpose of awarding attor
ney's fees in school desegregation cases is less to sanction
segregated schools than to assure that plaintiffs can bring suit. 162
Like compensatory damages, attorney's fees affect the liabilities of
the defendants. One could speculate that the equitable considera
tions involved in Bradley tipped the scales in favor of retroactivity.
If this is the case, however, it is unclear why a contrary result oc
curred in Landgraf given the equitable considerations before the
Court there. Permitting compensatory damages would not have vi
olated principles of fairness, reliance or expectations, when "[a]t no
time within the last generation has an employer had a vested right
156. The Court reasoned that allowing compensatory damages for harm caused
prior to the enactment of the statute "would have an impact on private parties' plan
ning" and would "attach an important new legal burden to that conduct." [d., at 1506.
Essentially, the Court articulated the principle that a person has a right to engage in
improper conduct in reliance of the sanctions in place at that time, and that this right is
protected from retroactive interference. See ill. at 1506 n.35.
157. [d. at 1503.
158. 416 U.S. 696 (1973).
159. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1503.
160. Id. "[I]t would be difficult to imagine a stronger equitable case for an attor
ney's fee award than a lawsuit in which the plaintiff parents would otherwise have to
bear the costs of desegregating their children's public schools." Id.
161. [d. at 1506.
162. "If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys'
fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by
invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts." Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd.,
416 U.S. 696, 719 (1974) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400,401
02 (1968».
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to engage in or to permit sexual harassment."163 In other words,
there was no preexisting right that the compensatory damages pro
vision of the Civil Rights Act retroactively interfered with. These
apparently inconsistent results beg the question of whether the first
prong of the Landgraf test is sound.
2.

Whether there is Clear Congressional Intent

Under the Landgraf test, if a statute is determined to have ret
roactive effect, a presumption against the retroactive application
will be applied, absent clear congressional intent to the contrary.164
The Court in Landgraf discerned Congress's intent regarding the
statute's temporal scope by analyses of both the text and legislative
history.165 The Landgraf majority's analysis of the text relied on
familiar canons of statutory interpretation. 166 The Court concluded
that the text did not indicate a congressional intent for the statute
to apply retroactively.167
In discerning Congress's intent, the Landgraf Court's statutory
interpretation was consistent with the theory of "intentionalism."168
Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1510 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1505.
165. See supra note 92.
166. For a compilation of canons of statutory construction, see William N. Es
kridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 27, 97-108 (1994). For a lengthy treatment of statutory
interpretation, see NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRucnoN (5th
ed. 1992 & rev. ed. 1994). For a listing of contradictory canons of statutory construction
juxtaposed to one another, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About how Statutes are to be Construed, 3 V AND. L.
REv. 395 (1950).
167. In sum, the Court reasoned that the several sections of the statute relied on
by the petitioner could be interpreted either for or against retroactivity, therefore fail"
ing to meet the standard of clear intent. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1493-96.
168. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 326 (1990). This view purportedly comports
with notions of the proper role of the judiciary in a representative democracy. In a
system where the courts are perceived to be agents of the legislature, "requiring the
courts to follow the legislature's intentions disciplines judges by inhibiting judicial law
making, and in so doing seems to further democracy by affirming the will of elected
representatives." Id. See also Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Struc
ture of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1995).
As a theory of statutory interpretation, "intentionalism" shares with two other
"grand theories of statutory interpretation"-"purposivism" and "textualism"-the
fundamental premise that statutory interpretation must be conducted using a single le
gitimate category of source. Eskridge & Frickey, supra, at 321 n.2. Thus "intentional
ism" requires courts to effectuate the legislature's intent, "purposivism" requires the
court to ascertain the legislature's purpose, and "textualism" relies exclusively on the
text of the statute. Id. at 326-41. In general, these three theories have been criticized
163.

164.

1996]

A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF PRACTICAL REASON

463

In accord with this theory, where the text of a statute is ambiguous,
the Court attempts to discern the clear intent of Congress. 169
Whether Congress's intent as to any statute is determinable
and by what means is the subject of much debate. 17o Scholars have
for interpreting statutes based on analysis of limited sources to the exclusion of other
potentially relevant materials. Id. at 322.
169. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1501.
170. In recent years the subject of statutory interpretation has received much at
tention. See Hans W. Baade, Time and Meaning: Notes on the Intertemporal Law of
Statutory Construction and Constitutional Interpretation. 43 AM. J. COMPo L. 319 (1995);
James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes:
Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1994); Maxwell O. Chibundu,
Structure and Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 62 U. ON. L. REv. 1439
(1994); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Continuation Coverage Under COBRA: A Study in Statu
tory Interpretation, 22 J. LEGIS. 195 (1996); Anthony D'Amato, The Injustice of Dy
namic Statutory Interpretation, 64 U. ClN. L. REv. 911 (1996); Veronica M. Dougherty,
Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism' Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory
Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 127 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 61 (1994); Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 13 (1995); William N. Es
kridge, Jr. & Judith N. Levi, Regulatory Varillbles and Statutory Interpretation, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 1103 (1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Ex
plorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1731 (1993); Lary Evans et aI., Congressional Procedure and Statutory Interpreta
tion,45 ADMIN. L. REv. 239 (1993); Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Lan
guage of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 35 (1996); Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74
N.C. L. REv. 585 (1996); Sang Hui Michael Kim, In re Alappat: A Strict Statutory Inter
pretation Determining Patentable Subject Matter Relating to Computer Software?, 13 J.
MARSHALL J. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. 635 (1995); William S. Jordan, III, Legislative His
tory and Statutory Interpretation: The Relevance ofEnglish Practice, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 1
(1994); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalill's Jurisprudence of Strict
Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 401 (1994); Michael P. Kenny &
Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe:
The Misapproprilltion Theory of Section 10(B), 59 ALB. L. REv. 139 (1995); James P.
Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons From Judges Interpreting Consumer Leg
islation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1994); Lori L. Outzs. A Principled Use of Congressional
Floor Speeches in Statutory Interpretation, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 297 (1995);
Stephen A. Plass, The lllusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REv. 93 (1995);
William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory Interpretation, 68 IND.
L.J. 865 (1993); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 71 (1994); Robert K. Rasmussen,
A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy
Cases,71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing
Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1995); Mu
riel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping GiIlnt: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L.
REv. 585 (1994); George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321 (1995);
George H. Taylor, Textualism at Work, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 259 (1995); James E. West
brook, A Comparison of the Interpretation of Statutes and Collective Bargaining Agree
ments: Grasping the Pivot of Tao, 60 Mo. L. REv. 283 (1995); Rebecca Hanner White,
The EEOC, The Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the
Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51.
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criticized "intentionalism" for assuming that there is a collective
"intent" of the entire legislature, and that this intent is cogniza
ble. 171 While alternative theories of statutory interpretation con
tinue to inquire into the purpose of legislation,172 these new
theories tend to rely on more eclectic sources in an effort to discern
the best legal result given the circumstances and context. 173 This
"practical reasoning" approach to statutory construction urges that
a court examine all relevant factors in reaching its conclusion. 174
Commentators often suggest that the Supreme Court in fact
reaches its decision based on practical reasoning, and then justifies
the result with traditional canons of statutory construction. 175
C.

An Alternative to the Landgraf Test

In the context of judicial analysis of statutory retroactivity,
For a list of books, articles, and other publications on statutory interpretation pub~
lished between 1987 and 1992, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PuBLIC POLICY,
Ch. 7 (Supp. 1992). For a thorough treatment of difficulties in the legislative problem
solving process itself, see Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure of Legislative
Methodology, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1281, 1316-53 (1994).
At least one view of statutory construction asserts that the debate itself is essen
tially moot. According to the Neo-Realist view, judicial opinions expressly based on
canons of statutory construction actually represent post hoc justifications for decisions
reached on other grounds. Thus, the written opinion of an appellate court does not
represent the actual reasons for the decision, nor the reasoning process of the judge.
See, e.g., Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A
Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993).
171. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 168, at 326. See Max Radin, Statutory Inter
pretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) ("That the intention of the legislature is
undiscoverable in any real sense is almost an immediate inference from a statement of
the proposition."). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 533 (1983); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Comment, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It":
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
172. Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpreta
tion: A Look at Regents v. Bakke, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 57 (1992); Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 168; Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Stat
utes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533 (1992); Edward L. Rubin,
Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Stat
utes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1991).
173. Farber, supra note 172; William N. Eskridge, Jr., DynamiC Statutory Interpre
tation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).
174. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 168, at 323.
175. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 168, at 323 (commenting that "practical rea
soning ... seems to describe what the Court actually does when it interprets a statute").
The Neo-Realists, who maintain that judicial opinions represent post hoc justifications
for decisions reached on other grounds, agree that the "practical reasoning" approach
most closely approximates the actual decision-making process of appellate courts. See
Martineau, supra note 170, at 32.
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commentators have long held a suspicion that court decisions osten
sibly based upon distinctions of vested and non vested rights were in
fact reached on other groundsP6 Under this theory, the applica
tion of the presumption against retroactivity is perceived to be the
end result of "the usual process of statutory construction-the bal
ancing of policies which may militate in favor of preserving an al
legedly protected interest against" the interests of effectuating the
purpose of the statuteP7 The equitable considerations of fairness,
reliance and expectations that the Landgraf opinion ostensibly en
dorsed as relevant factors will inevitably be considered as policies in
favor of preserving an interest. Therefore, this "balancing of poli
cies" accounts for circumstances in a given case that inspired the
rule against retroactivity to begin with.
Unjust results are likely to occur more often when the rule
against retroactivity is applied without an examination of whether
any of the reasons that underlie the presumption inhere in the case
at issueP8 Consequently, commentators have argued that the ret
roactivity decision should be based on "whether applying the stat
ute at issue to a given case implicates any of the dangers of
retroactivity: unsettling expectations, depriving parties of notice, or
targeting vulnerable groups."179
Analysis of whether a statute should apply retroactively neces
sarily involves both an examination of the statute and the rights
potentially affected. 180 When a statute is unclear as to its temporal
176. See Smith, supra note 147, at 246. It has been suggested that, when distin
guishing between vested and non-vested rights, courts are actually providing post hoc
justification for a decision reached on some other basis. "It is submitted that the dis
tinction between vested and non-vested rights ... is of use primarily as a basis on which
to classify decisions after they have already been reached on other grounds." Id.
The Neo-Realists maintain that there is a clear distinction in the appellate process
between decision-making, which occurs when the judges hearing an appeal confer on
how the case ought to be decided, and decision justifying, which is essentially what the
published opinion is. See Martineau, supra note 170, at 25. Thus, judicial opinions
rarely reflect the thought processes of the judges in reaching a decision. The opinion
"is, rather, a reasoned justification of the decision prepared after the decision is made."
Id. at 27.
177. Greenblatt, supra note 83, at 551.
178. The presumption against retroactivity "fails to involve courts in any exami
nation of the effects of particular laws and instead applies a stringent and unyielding
test. Statutes differ in purpose and effect, yet the clear-statement rule treats them all
identically." Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 982 F.2d 295, 299 n.3 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney,
J., dissenting). Where retroactive application of a statute would serve justice, the pre
sumption against retroactivity "uncritically sanctions harsh results." Id.
179. Michele A. Estrin, Note, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 to Pending Cases, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2035,2069 (1992).
180. "[A]nalysis of retroactivity cannot be dissociated from analysis of the right
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scope, the "test" involves evaluating whether the strength of the
interest affected warrants interpreting the statute prospectively.l81
It follows that the greater the evidence of legislative purpose imply
ing retroactive application of the statute, the stronger the interest
affected must be to require prospective application.
While the Supreme Court in Landgraf noted that these equita
ble considerations should be taken into account, the Court failed to
expressly base its decision on them. As a result, the Court's reason
ing was unclear;182 In contrast, commentators posit that if courts
"focus on actual objections to retroactivity and whether these ob
jections inhere in a particular statute [their] inquiry will lead to
well-reasoned and inherently more just opinions."183
This analytical approach of focusing on the actual objections to
a retroactive application of a statute essentially expresses the gen
eral "practical reasoning" approach towards statutory interpreta
tion, as applied in the specific context of retroactivity.
Consideration of the impact that the retroactive application of a
statute will have on interests of reliance or expectation interests, in
light of the legislative objectives, comports with the practical rea
soning approach-examining all relevant material to discern the
best legal result given the context. l84 This approach is more flexible
which is destroyed and of the statute which is invoked to destroy it." Greenblatt, supra
note 83, at 550.
181. Id.
182. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
183. Estrin, supra note 179, at 2069.
184. "Practical reason, unfortunately, is easier to invoke than to define." See Far
ber, supra note 172, at 539. The pragmatic approach of practical reason may easily be
mistaken as an ad hoc method that attempts only to reach a just outcome on the facts of
a particular case. Thus, practical reason has been criticized as incoherent, SUbjective,
and unpredictable. Id. at 534. Adherents to the practical reason school, however, ex
plain that the method is not one of ad hoc decision-making. Id. at 539. "Rather, it
means a rejection of the view that rules and precedents in and of themselves dictate
outcomes." Id.
The practical reason theory is used as an analytical framework to interpret statutes
by developing their contextual meaning, rather than deducing a fixed rule. As an ap
proach to legal problems, practical reason includes consideration of "history and con
text; a desire to avoid abstracting away the human component in judicial decisionmak
ing; an appreciation for the complexity of life; some faith in dialogue and deliberation; a
tolerance of ambiguity, accommodation, and tentativeness, but a skepticism of rigid
dichotomies; and an overall humility." Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical
Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1615, 1646 (1987).
Accordingly, the practical reason approach to statutory construction requires the
consultation of all sources relevant to the interpretation of a statute. "These sources
include the statutory text, legislative expectations, statutory purposes, evolution of the
statute over time, and coherence of the statute with the broader public law." Philip P.
Frickey, CongreSSional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the DynamiC Nature of Federal
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than the two-part Landgraf test, because it may include considera
tion of circumstances beyond the scope of a traditional "intention
alism" approach to statutory construction. Hence, the two inquiries
involved in the Landgraf test are important factors under the prac
tical reasoning approach, but they are not exclusive of other
considerations.
Because a practical reasoning approach approximates more
closely the actual process that courts use in interpreting a statute,185
the legal analysis that follows employs a practical reasoning ap
proach. Therefore, rather than applying the two-part Landgraf test
of whether the statute is retroactive in effect and whether there is
clear congressional intent, this Note will analyze the issue in accord
with the. practical reasoning based approach to analyzing statutory
retroactivity. It will examine (1) the strength of the interest in ex
clusive cable franchise agreements, and. (2) the evidence of the leg
islative objectives in enacting section 541(a), in light of relevant
facts.
V.

SHOULD SEcnON 541(a) OF THE 1992 CABLE Acr APPLY TO
EXISTING EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISES?

This analysis concludes that section 541(a) presumptively ap
plies retroactively to preexisting exclusive franchises. The pre
sumption may be rebutted by circumstances that warrant the
protection of exclusivity in a particular case. Part A demonstrates
that the strength of the interest in exclusivity varies depending on
the circumstances of the given franchise. In general, these circum
stances include the extent that natural monopoly conditions exist,
and whether consumer interests are being adequately served. The
existence of natural monopoly conditions militate in favor of exclu
sivity, while poor consumer service militates in favor of competi
tion. Independent of these conditions, the interest in exclusivity in
cable franchising is weak because cable providers lack any justifi
able reliance interest in federal law,l86 and because public policy
concerns militate against exclusivity in the context of cable televi
sion. 18? In addition, potential violations of antitrust law and the
First Amendment favor retroactive application.
Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1208 (1990). The resulting interpretation is there
fore "likely to be the product of congeries of supporting, interactive arguments, rather
than a single, deductive conclusion from one source of meaning." Id. at 1209.
185. See Martineau, supra note 170, at 32.
186. See infra part V.A.1.
187. See infra part V.A.2.
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Relying on the text of the Cable Television Consumer Protec
tion and Competition Act, Part B of this analysis demonstrates that
the purpose of the Act is to remedy the situation created by the
1984 Cable Act-unregulated monopoly. Part B concludes that the
Act is designed to protect consumer interests harmed by the effects
of unregulated monopoly, by promoting managed competition. In
Part C, the legislative history of the Act is examined. Part C con
cludes that applying section 541(a) to negate preexisting exclusive
franchises is consistent with the objectives of the Act.
The analysis concludes that a presumption in favor of retroac
tivity exists regarding section 541(a), based on an assessment of the
strength of the interest in exclusivity, the legislative purpose of the
Act in light of the history of the cable industry, and an analysis of
the legislative history of the Act. However, exclusivity of cable
franchises is not negated per se. Part D explains that the clause
"unreasonably refuse to grant" in section 541(a)(1) means that ex
clusivity is negated where (1) a second cable provider applies for a
franchise and (2) no sufficient reasons exist to justify the exclusivity
of the preexisting franchise to the extent that a grant of an addi
tional franchise would be "unreasonable." Part D explains the
application of the "unreasonable refusal" standard and the circum
stances that warrant protection of the interest in exclusivity in a
given case.
A. Assessing the Strength of the Interest in Exclusivity and
Section 541 (a)
A "new provision [that] attaches new legal consequences to
events completed before its enactment" is retroactive in effect. lss
Section 541(a), if interpreted to permit the awarding of second
franchises regardless of exclusive preexisting franchises, would in
effect negate exclusivity provisions that were agreed to prior to the
enactment of the 1992 Cable Act. Under the practical reasoning
approach, the starting point for determining whether section
541(a)(1) applies retroactively is to ascertain the strength of soci
ety's interest in exclusivity. Several factors indicate that the general
interest in exclusivity is not compelling. First, cable providers have
long been on notice that the cable industry was subject to federal
regulation. Therefore, cable providers could not reasonably rely on
franchising exclusivity as impervious to regulation. Second, public
policy disfavors exclusive trade agreements that unreasonably re
188.

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1499 (1994).
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strain trade. Exclusive cable franchises, in effect, often test if not
exceed the limits of public policy. Third, exclusive franchises may
also violate the First Amendment.
While society's interest in exclusive cable franchises in general
is therefore insufficient to require interpreting section 541(a) pro
spectively only, the existence of specific conditions in a particular
franchise may justify exclusivity. The strength of the interest in ex
clusivity in a particular franchise agreement is therefore dependent
on the surrounding circumstances. 189
1. Reliance, Predictability and Stability
The exclusivity of a franchise agreement is contractual. Con
tract rights are recognized under Landgraf to be most often af
forded a presumption against retroactivity.190 To be consistent with
the practical reasoning approach, however, the focus of the inquiry
is not whether exclusivity is contractual, but whether the reasons
for protecting contract rights inhere in exclusive cable franchises.
The importance of maintaining predictability and stability in the
area of contract and property rights derives from the nature of our
free market economy where the acquisition of wealth constitutes
the primary incentive to work. 191 Frequent legislative changes that
disrupt relied-upon contractual or property expectations serve to
undermine our economic system. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
has often construed statutes prospectively so as not to disturb con
tract and property rights.192
Conversely, legislatures are not to be absolutely constricted in
their lawmaking functions by preexisting contracts. The Supreme
Court has noted that "[i]mmunity from federal regulation is not
gained through forehanded contracts."193 In the case of interstate
commerce, the Court has been particularly clear that Congress will
not be impeded in legislating because of private contracts. 194 It fol
189. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 168, at 323.
190. Landgraf, 114 s. Ct. at 1500.
191. See Greenblatt, supra note 83, at 567.
192. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1500 (citing United States v. Security Indus. Bank,
459 U.S. 70, 79-82 (1982»; Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141, 164
(1944); United States v. St. Louis, S.F. & T.R. Co., 270 U.S. 1,3 (1926); Holt v. Henley,
232 U.S. 637, 639 (1914); Union Pac. R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190,199
(1913); Twenty per Cent. Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 179, 187 (1874); Sohn v. Waterson, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 596, 599 (1873); Carroll v. Carroll's Lessee, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 275
(1853).
193. Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947).
194. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1932). The Court in Sproles stated:
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lows that the interest in cable franchise exclusivity is subordinate to
the authority of the legislature. The question presented then re
gards the strength of the exclusivity interest. 195
"[P]redictability and stability" are principles central to contract
rights.1 96 Thus, an important consideration in examining the
strength of the interest of cable franchisees in the exclusivity of
their agreement is the reasonable extent to which the franchisee
relied on governmental noninterference with their contract rights.
As cable franchising agreements were entered into with govern
. ment authorities, the cable franchisees might expect to reasonably
rely on their agreements as countenanced by law.
Nonetheless, while cable franchisees entered into agreements
in reliance on the then existing law, "it [was] clear that by 1972, the
FCC had asserted its rulemaking preemptive power over all the
state actions in regulating the cable industry; its term regulation
served as notice to the cable industry that it was subject to the po
tential exercise of preemptive federal authority."197 Thus, any
cable franchise agreement entered into after 1972 may be viewed as
one made in contemplation of federal regulation.1 98 Under such
notice, the extent to which cable franchisees may have reasonably
relied on the fact that the government would not interfere with
their contractually obtained rights is not substantial.
.
Further, municipalities and cable franchisees bargained for
their agreements under the same reliance upon federal law. Thus,
municipalities were relying that the federal government would not
subsequently interfere with their contractually obtained rights.
However, that is precisely what occurred when Congress enacted
With respect to the power of Congress in the regulation of interstate com
merce, this court has had frequent occasion to observe that it is not fettered by
the necessity of maintaining existing arrangements which would conflict with
the execution of its policy, as such a restriction would place the regulation of
interstate commerce in the hands of private individuals and withdraw from the
control of Congress so much of the field as they might choose by prophetic
discernment to bring within the range of their agreements.
Id. (citations omitted).
195. "[T]he court must determine whether at the date of enactment the event or
events which have occurred up to that point create a sufficiently strong interest to jus
tify an interpretation that the legislature could not in the absence of specific language
have intended to destroy or modify such interest." Greenblatt, supra note 83, at 550.
196. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1500.
197. James Cable Partners v. City of Jamestown, 822 F. Supp. 476, 478 (M.D.
Tenn. 1993), affd, 43 F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 1995).
198. This is analogous to Sproles, 286 U.S. at 390 (1932), where the Court stated
that "[c]ontracts which relate to the use of the highways must be deemed to have been
made in contemplation of the regulatory authority of the state." Id.
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the 1984 Cable Act and limited franchising authorities' power to
regulate cable providers. l99 Moreover, the 1984 Act served as addi
tional notice that the cable industry was subject to federal
regulation.
Thus, the cable industry's interest in reliance in general is not
substantial. The salient exception, however, is exclusive franchises
entered into after the 1984 Act was enacted, because they were not
bargained for under the assumption that municipalities possessed
the power to regulate rates. In these circumstances, the cable fran
chisee's interest in exclusivity may be stronger because the munici
pality was presumably aware of the limits on its regulatory power,
and therefore had some opportunity to bargain for other provisions
safeguarding consumer interests.
2.

Public Policy Against Exclusivity

The strength of the interest in exclusivity, grounded in the ne
cessity to protect contractual rights, is eroded by the public policy
against exclusive agreements. The Restatement (Second) of Con
tracts, section 186(1), states that "[a] promise is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably in restraint of
trade."2°O The Restatement defines a promise to be in "restraint of
trade if its performance would limit competition. "201 A promise in
restraint of trade is unenforceable if it is "unreasonably detrimental
to the smooth operation of a freely competitive private econ
omy."202 However, the unreasonableness of a given agreement
must be examined in light of "the promisee's legitimate interests,
the hardship that it imposes on the promisor, and the likely injury
to the public."203 Thus, public policy disfavors exclusive agree
ments when they are likely to injure consumer interests.
The Restatement essentially expresses the public policy that
guides antitrust law. 204 Judge Posner has discussed the application
199. See supra part I.A.3 for a discussion of the 1984 Cable Communications Pol
icy Act.
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 186(1) (1981).
201. [d.
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 186 ernt. a (1981).
203. [d.
204. It is, of course, misleading to speak of antitrust law as if it were uniform or
static. Distinctions and differences are pervasive in antitrust law due to different juris
prudential approaches, ranging from the common law to the law and economics per
spective. HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, at 48-68. In addition, the implementation of
antitrust law varies with changes in political leadership. [d. at 68. Nonetheless, the
general common law policy against anticompetitive conduct that is expressed in the
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of antitrust principles in the context of exclusive cable franchises. 205
Circumstances that may justify granting an exclusive franchise in
compliance with antitrust law include whether the particular geo
graphic cable market is a natural monopoly and whether an exclu
sive franchise advances consumer interests. 206 Several courts have
addressed the natural monopoly question in the cable television
context. 207
The proposition that cable was a natural monopoly initially jus
tified granting exclusive franchises. 208 Whether cable is actually a
natural monopoly has since been strongly challenged and de
bated. 209 One premise of the natural monopoly argument initially
relied upon to justify exclusive franchising was that the cable indus
try exhibits economies of scale. This argument states that cable
providers have a strong incentive to acquire all subscribers in a
given area as a means of reducing average cost of providing cable
per customer and increasing profits.210 The incentive is purportedly
so strong that competition will lead inexorably to a single provider.
Competition is therefore perceived as futile, yielding no long term
benefits to consumers in the long run, and wasting resources and
causing disruption in the short run. 211 However, current data
reveals that competition as well as the mere threat of competition
Restatement predated federal legislation. The most salient difference between the
common law and federal antitrust law is that the common law merely renders anticom
petitive agreements unenforceable, while federal antitrust law makes them affirmatively
illegal. Id. at 52.
205. Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir.
1982).
206. Id. at 127. This presumes that there is no state action immunity from federal
antitrust liability. See generally Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
455 U.S. 40 (1982).
207. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488
(1986); Community Communications, 455 U.S. 40; Central Telecommunications, Inc. v.
TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987);
Tele-Communications, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Omega
Satellite Prods., 694 F.2d 119; Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976
(D.R.I. 1983), vacated, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
208. See supra part 1.
209. See, e.g., ALBERT K. SMILEY, DIREcr COMPETITION AMONG CABLE TELEVI·
SION SYSTEMS (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Division, Discussion Paper, v. EAG 86
9, 1986); Brenner, supra note 15; Hazlett, supra note 15.
210. The cost of adding each additional subscriber is minimal once the cable grid
is installed. Thus, with each additional subscriber, the average cost (the amount of
money invested in the cable grid divided by the number of subscribers) per subscriber
diminishes, and the margin of profit increases.
211. See supra part LA.l for a discussion of natural monopoly.

1996]

A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF PRACTICAL REASON

473

in a cable franchise area leads to lower prices and better service.212
Indeed, the Senate Commerce Committee agreed with this conclu
sion, finding that costs to subscribers were significantly lower in ar
eas subject to service by more than one cable provider. 213
.Another argument offered in support of the natural monopoly
theory was that the cable industry is "capital intensive." Conse
quently, cable providers should be given the opportunity to recoup
their initial investment while protected from the threat of larger
"overbuilders" who might be in an economic position to sacrifice
short term losses in the interest of underselling the competition and
capturing the market. 214 As a logical corollary to this argument,
exclusivity should be granted for some limited period reflecting a
reasonable time necessary for a cable provider to stabilize its posi
tion. However, the duration of many exclusive franchises by far
exceeded any conceivably reasonable period.215 Thus an interest in
exclusivity may be reasonable for a limited period of time. What
constitutes reasonable duration would seem to be del ~ndent on the
circumstances of the case relating to the time necessary for the pro
vider to recoup its investment.
Finally, exclusive franchises were perceived to be in the con
sumer interest because it was believed that a single provider could
deliver the cheapest service.216 However, consumer interests ap
peared to suffer sharply as subscription rates rose and the quality of
service decreased during the period after the 1984 Cable Act.217 In
deed, by 1991, consumer dissatisfaction with cable television service
had reached an all-time high. 218
In short, there is a strong policy against exclusive trade agree
ments, as expressed in the Restatement and in antitrust law. Yet in
the cable industry the widely held perception of cable as a natural
monopoly traditionally ameliorated these policy concerns. Scholars
and policy makers, however, have begun to question and refute this
perception.

212. See Hazlett, supra note 15, at 1371-75.
213. S. REp. No. 92, supra note 5, at 14, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1146.
214. See HAMBURG, supra note 26.
215. Some franchises were agreed to for periods of 20-60 years. See Copple,
supra note 38, at 23-24.
216. See supra part I.A.l for a discussion of economies of scale.
217. See supra part I.A.4.
218. See Arnesen & Blizinsky, supra note 43, at 640-41..
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The First Amendment

An additional consideration regarding the strength of the inter
est in exclusive franchises concerns First Amendment speech issues
relevant to exclusive cable franchising. 219 Cable providers seeking
access to markets argue that municipalities impede free speech by
limiting the number of cable providers. In City of Los Angeles v.
Preferred Communications, Inc. ,220 the Supreme Court ruled that
cable providers are speakers under the First Amendment. 221 In
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Com
mission,222 the intermediate scrutiny standard was applied to free
speech questions involving cable television. 223 Under intermediate
scrutiny, a "regulation will be sustained if 'it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest."'224 Municipalities
have argued that the natural monopoly conditions of the cable in
dustry justify government limitations on the number of cable prov
iders through exclusive franchises and that an exclusive franchise is
thereby constitutiona1.225
Courts have reached different conclusions over whether the
circumstances in various franchise areas warrant the granting of an
exclusive franchise in light of the First Amendment.226 In these
cases, whether the First Amendment was violated by franchising
219. See Jeff Gray, Note, Thrner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC' The Need for
a New Approach in First Amendment Jurisprudence of the Cable Industry, 29 U.S.F. L.
REv. 999 (1995); Matthew D. Segal, Recent Development, The First Amendment and
Cable Television: Thrner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), 18
HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 916 (1995).
220. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
221. Id.
222. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
223. Id. at 2469.
224. Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968».
225. See, e.g., Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1469
(N.D. Cal. 1986).
226. For courts holding that the First Amendment was violated, see Cox Cable
Communications, Inc. v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 633 (M.D. Ga. 1991), remanded by
992 F.2d 1178 (11th Cir. 1993); Pacific W. Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp.
1322 (E.D. Cal. 1987); Group W Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954
(N.D. Cal. 1987); Century Fed., 648 F. Supp. 1465. For courts holding that the Constitu
tion was not violated, see Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n,
879 F.2d 1540 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); Central Telecommuni
cations, Inc. V. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
910 (1987).
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practices turned largely on the same factual questions pertinent to
antitrust inquiries-i.e., whether a natural monopoly existed. 227
For instance, the physical constraints228 relevant to granting cable
licenses, if they in fact exist, may serve as a substantial interest of
the municipality justifying the limitations on franchising. 229 Propo
nents of this argument posit that, due to the space required for the
installation of cable systems, the city has a legitimate interest in lim
iting the number of cable providers to avert excessive disruption of
public areas. 230 Cities, however, have not always been able to meet
the burden of demonstrating that granting an exclusive franchise
furthers their substantial interests in regulating the disruption of the
public domain.231 In such cases, an interest in exclusivity must yield
to the First Amendment.
B.

Legislative Purpose of Section 541(a) .

No single element of the text conclusively indicates that section
541(a) was intended to apply to exclusive preexisting franchises.
The totality of text, however, indicates that the purpose of the legis
lation was to advance consumer interests by promoting managed
competition and regulating rates. From this general legislative pur
pose it may be inferred that section 541(a) should be applied retro
actively when the circumstances require-primarily where the
absence of competition harms consumer interests, and no condi
tions exist that justify exclusivity.
The Supreme Court has often stated that the "starting point for
interpretation of a statute 'is the language of the statute itself. "'232
Section 541(a) states that "a franchising authority may not grant an
exclusive franchise and may not unreasonably refuse to award an
.additional competitive franchise."233 Thus the first clause of section
227. See supra note 226 for cases discussing these issues.
228. In the case of cable, the term "physical restraints" refers to the limitation on
how many wires could be run and poles utilized due to space limitations.
229. Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 125 (7th
Cir. 1982). '''In the very nature of things there must be some limit to the number of
telephone and light companies that can serve the public by the use of the streets of a
town or a city for the location of poles, wires, and necessary appliances.'" Id. (quoting
State ex rei. Evansville Tel. Co. v. Stickelman, 105 N.E. 777,779 (Ind. 1914».
230. [d.
231. See, e.g., Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1478
(N.D. Cal. 1986).
232. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1508 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827,838
(1990».
233. 47 U.S.c. § 541(a) (1994).
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541(a) expressly prohibits granting exclusive franchises. The mean
ing of the second clause, which proscribes "unreasonable" refusals
to grant second franchises, is less clear. The question of whether
section 541(a) may operate to negate preexisting exclusivity turns
on the definition of "unreasonable." Indeed, the court in James
Cable concluded that a preexisting exclusive franchise is a perfectly
"reasonable" basis to refuse to award another franchise. 234
The text of a provision in a statute is often constructed with
reference to the larger statutory scheme as a whole. 235 Thus, an
ambiguity in the intended definition of a term may be resolved by
discerning the general purposes and policies advanced by the Act as
a whole. This Note will demonstrate that, based on the express
findings of Congress, the stated purpose of the Act, and inferences
drawn from other relevant sections, an "unreasonable refusal to
grant a second franchise" means a refusal that will injure consumer
interests by impeding competition, or a refusal that will harm legiti
mate interests in exclusivity.
1.

Congressional Findings

Section 521 of the Act indicates the general issues that Con
gress sought to address by enacting the legislation. In section
521(a) of the Act, entitled "Findings," Congress explicated the un
favorable market conditions faced by consumers in the cable indus
try, such as the monopoly held by most cable systems that resulted
in "undue market power" of cable operators as compared to con
sumers236 and the consequent dramatic increases in cable rates. 237
Congress recognized that the monopolistic conditions had arisen for
a number of legitimate reasons. 238 Regardless. the injurious effect
of monopoly conditions on consumers compelled the enactment of
the legislation. Congress promulgated as policy that consumer in
terests be protected where effective competition in the market was
absent.239 The primary means of protecting consumer interests
were stated as "ensur[ing] that cable television operators do not
have undue market power vis-a-vis video programmers and con
234. James Cable Partners v. City of Jamestown, 43 F.3d 277, 280 (6th Cir. 1995).
235. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86,
94-95 (1993).
236. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (1994).
237. § 521(a)(1).
238. § 521(a)(2). Among the reasons cited were "local franchising requirements
and the extraordinary expense of constructing more than one cable television system to
serve a particular geographic area." Id.
239. § 521(b)(4).
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sumers."240 Thus, section 521 indicates that section 541(a) should
be interpreted to effectuate the reduction of the market power pos
sessed by cable providers. 241
2.

Other Provisions Illustrative of Legislative Objectives

Reference to other provisions of the Act assist in the interpre
tation of section 541(a). Section 548 deals with problems of unfair
competition marked by exclusive contracts between video program
mers and providers. 242 This section comports with the express pur
poses of eliminating undue market power illustrated in section
521. 243
Section 548(h)(1) narrowly prescribes the context where preex
isting exclusive franchises may be affected. 244 This provision may
be interpreted as either limiting the retroactive application of the
section, or affirmatively granting the statute a limited retroactive
scope. The absence of any such express provision concerning sec
tion 541(a)'s temporal scope may similarly indicate either that Con
gress did not intend to limit section 541(a)'s retroactive application,
or that Congress did not intend to affirmatively grant any retroac
tive scope. 245 While it is unclear what the significance is of the ab
sence of a provision similar to section 548(h)(1) in section 541(a),
section 548 reiterates that the purpose of the Act is to promote con
sumer interests by facilitating managed competition.
The last textual reference bearing on retroactivity is section
541(f), which states that no provision of the 1992 Cable Act shall be
240. § 521(b)(5).
241. For a discussion of what value "findings" sections of legislation hold towards
understanding the legislation, see Gouvin, supra note 170, at 1327-34. Professor
Gouvin notes that "findings" sections do not necessarily reflect the actual problems
which the legislation addresses. He explains that "[t]he disparity between the official
findings and the real problems evidences the drafter's efforts to translate the real
problems into politically acceptable language." Id. at 1329..
242. See § 548.
243. Id.
244. § 548(h)(1). For a discussion of the application of this section to existing
contracts, see Allard. supra note 54, at 327-29. Section 548(h)(1) states:
Nothing in this section shall affect any contract that grants exclusive distribu
tion rights to any person with respect to satellite cable programming and that
was entered into on or before June 1, 1990. except that the provisions of sub- .
section (c)(2)(C) of this section shall apply for distribution to persons in areas
not served by a cable operator.
§ 548(h)(1).
245. In the absence of any other indication of congressional intent, a similar prob
lem of interpretation in Landgraf was resolved in favor of the presumption against
retroactivity. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1494 (1994).
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interpreted to prevent a local or municipal franchising authority
from operating its own franchise, regardless of other franchises
granted by theauthority.246 Section 541(f)'s proscription specifies
that interpretations of the Act which would prohibit municipalities
from providing cable services are in violation of section 541(f)
"notwithstanding the granting of one or more franchises by such
franchising authority."247 As the prohibition does not expressly re
fer to the granting of an "exclusive franchise," it does not assist in
interpreting'section 541(a).
In sum, the text of section 541 alone does not provide a clear
expression of whether "unreasonable refusal to grant a second
franchise" applies where a preexisting exclusive franchise exists.
The text of the Act as a whole, however, does state a strong policy
in favor of managed competition as a means to promoting con
sumer interests.
C.

Legislative Histo ry 248

The legislative history of the 1992 Cable Act demonstrates that
section 541(a) is applicable to preexisting exclusive franchises. The
history illustrates that preexisting exclusive franchises were in the
contemplation of Congress when enacting section 541(a). The
Committee Reports also illuminate the meaning of the clause "un
reasonably refuse to grant a second franchise" in section 541(a).
246. See supra note 128 for the text of § 541(f)(1). The James Cable court held
that it was an exclusive franchise, and not a prospective interpretation of § 541(a), that
prevented the municipal authority from operating its own franchise. James Cable Part
ners v. City of Jamestown, 43 F.3d 277, 280 (6th Cir. 1995). The court's reasoning is
problematic because it presupposes that § 541(a) is interpreted to operate prospectively
so as not to effect the enforceability of an exclusivity provision. In other words, an
exclusive franchise to which a municipality is a party may restrict the municipality from
operating its own franchise only if the exclusivity itself is enforceable. The exclusivity
of the franchise is enforceable only if § 541(a) is interpreted prospectively, so that refus
ing to grant a second franchise due to a preexisting exclusive franchise does not consti
tute an "unreasonable refusal to grant a second franchise."
The court reasoned that "[e]ven if [§ 541(a)] did not exist," the municipality would
be prohibited from operating a competing franchise because of the enforceability of the
exclusivity provision. Id. Section 541(a) exists, and the enforceability of an exclusivity
provision is contingent upon its interpretation. Consequently, as a provision of the Act,
if § 541(a) is interpreted to operate prospectively and that interpretation prohibits a
municipal authority from operating as a cable provider, it violates § 541(f).
247. § 541(f)(1) (emphasis added).
248. Legislative history may be used to rebut or confirm a statute's plain meaning
or to clarify ambiguities. See Eskridge, supra note 92, at 626. See also Susan G. Fentin,
Note, Finding Middle Ground Between Opportunity and Opportunism: The "Original
Source" Provision of 31 V.S.c. § 3730(e) (4) , 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 255, 285-90
(1995).
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Finally, the legislative history confirms a congressional purpose to
address the problems created by the 1984 Cable Act. Of the volu
minous materials constituting the legislative history of the 1992
Cable Act,249 the Conference Committee report and the Senate
Commerce Committee report provide the most authoritative state
ments pertinent to section 541(a) of the Act.250 According to the
Commerce Committee report, the purpose of the 1992 Act was to
promote competition in the cable industry, in response to the undue
market power possessed by the cable industry and the detrimental
effect that this circumstance had on consumers. 251 The Senate
Commerce Committee report noted that most consumers face a sin
gle cable provider, who, by virtue of its monopoly, is permitted to
provide poor service yet retain customer patronage. 252 The Senate
Commerce Committee reported that competition between cable
systems is beneficial, and franchising authorities should accordingly
be encouraged to award second franchises. 253 However, the Com
mittee recognized that "this provision alone is not going to result in
overnight competition."254 An inference may be drawn from this
admission that the drafters did not intend section 541(a) to apply
retroactively. The Committee's concession that competition will
not be effectuated "overnight" may indicate an awareness of the
delayed effect the statute would have, attributable to the existence
249. See Allard, supra note 54, at 307-08.
250. Scholars of the practical reason school have recognized a hierarchy of the
evidentiary value of various sources of legislative history, based on the sources' compar
ative reliability. See Eskridge, supra note 92, at 636. Committee reports are relied
upon most often by the Court, as they are considered to represent "the considered and
collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying pro
posed legislation." See Eskridge, supra note 92, at 637 (citing Carro & Brann, The U.S.
Supreme Court & the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS
294 (1982». Other forms of legislative history afforded less probative value are sponsor
statements, rejected proposals, floor and hearing debate, views of nonlegislator drafters,
legislative inaction and subsequent legislative history, in that order of importance. See
Eskridge, supra note 92, at 636.
251. S. REp. No. 92, supra note 5, at 1, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1133.
252. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
253. S. REp. No. 92, supra note 5, at 14. reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1146.
The Senate Commerce Committee stated that:
Based on the evidence in the record taken as whole. it is clear that there are
benefits from competition between two cable systems. Thus, the Committee
believes that local franchising authorities should be encouraged to award sec
ond franchises. Accordingly, S.12 [the Committee's report] as reported, pro
hibits local franchising authorities from unreasonably refusing to grant second
franchises.
ld.
254. Id.
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of preexisting exclusive contracts. Conversely, the statement may
simply have been in recognition that the passage of the legislation
would not automatically trigger large-scale entry into the cable pro
vider market, or that in many markets second franchisees will not
seek entry despite availability. Thus, the report of the Senate Com
merce Committee confirms that the purpose of the Act is to pro
mote competition, yet fails to clearly indicate whether section
541(a) ought to be applied retroactively.
The Conference Committee report, unlike the Senate Commit
tee report, does give an indication of the intended application of
section 541(a):
The conferees believe that exclusive franchises are directly con
trary to federal policy and to the purposes of S. 12, which is in
tended to promote the development of competition. Exclusive
franchises artificially protect the cable operator from competi
tion. Moreover, at the time most of the exclusive franchises were
awarded, local authorities had the power to regulate the rates for
basic cable service. However, the 1984 Cable Act repealed local
authorities' ability to regulate rates. 255

The Committee makes specific reference to exclusive franchises
awarded prior to the enactment of the statute, underscoring that
the franchising authorities' ability to regulate the cable provider
was a basic element of those exclusive agreements. In the absence
of that regulatory authority, competition must exist to protect con
sumer interests.256 This statement compels a strong inference that
the Committee intended the statute to apply retroactively to preex
isting franchise agreements. 257 The language indicates that pre ex
255. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 862, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. 77-78 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1259-60 (emphasis added).
256. Remarks by then Senator Gore during floor debate are representative of this
proposition. The Senator argued that the 1984 Cable Act "took away the ability of
local governments to hold [cable] companies accountable." 138 CONGo REc. S421 (daily
ed. Jan. 27, 1992) (statement of Sen. Gore). The result, argued Gore, was that munici
palities could "still give a monopoly franchise but ... can't protect [its] citizens." Id. at
S422. Gore then asserted that this situation would be remedied by the 1992 Act, stating
that: "If this bill passes, we will introduce competition for cable television companies
and, ... we will restore some ability for local governments to hold these companies
accountable. No industry in this country should be in a situation where it has zero
competition and zero regulation." Id. The ability of local governments to hold compa
nies accountable is achieved in part by the ability to grant second franchises, thus facili
tating competition.
257. The court in James Cable quotes the same passage, yet excludes the last
three sentences. One can only speculate as to why the court did not address the import
of the last three sentences of the passage. James Cable Partners v. City of Jamestown,
43 F.3d 277, 280 (6th Cir. 1995).
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isting exclusive franchises were in the contemplation of the Con
ference Committee when enacting this provision.
In addition, the Senate Committee Report indicates that sec
tion 541(a)'s standard of "unreasonable refusal" must be deter
mined according to the circumstances of the particular case. In the
"Summary of Major Provisions," the Committee report provides
some guidance for determining when a refusal to grant a second
franchise is unreasonable. 258 The report states that "[i]t shall not lie
considered unreasonable for purposes of this provision for local
franchising authorities to deny the application of a potential com
petitor if it is technically infeasible" although other legitimate rea
sons for denying an application may exist. 259 Technical infeasibility
refers to such problems as installing a new cable grid. This explana
tion recognizes the justification for an exclusive franchise in the
face of a First Amendment challenge-that of physical incapacity of
the area to absorb another cable provider. 260
The Committee statements comport with the general history of
the development and regulation of the cable industry. Specifically,
as cable was regulated due to the perceived "natural monopoly"
status of the cable industry, consumer interests were presumably
protected by such regulation. 261 However, because the 1984 Cable
Act significantly limited rate regulation, circumscribed franchise
fees, and provided for a presumption in favor of franchise renewal,
consumer interests became less protected. 262 The history of the
1992 Cable Act indicates that the general purpose of the Act was to
address the unregulated monopoly created by the 1984 Act.
To summarize, with the promotion of competition as the stated
objective of the 1992 Act, Congress attempted to protect consumer
interests by replacing the regulatory power lost by municipalities in
the 1984 Act with managed competition. The elimination of exclu
sivity is an obvious prerequisite to attaining this goal. As demon
strated in Part A of this section of the Note, the interest in
exclusivity is in general not sufficient to warrant protection from
the retroactive application of section 541(a). Parts Band C make
clear that the text and legislative history of the 1992 Cable Act to
258. S. REP. No. 92, supra note 5, at 91, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1224.
259. Id.
260. See supra note 229 and accompanying text for a discussion of physical
incapacity.
261. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
262. See supra part 1.A.3.
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gether indicate that section 541(a) applies to preexisting franchise
agreements.
D.

The "Unreasonable Refusal" Standard

Section 541(a) states that a "franchising authority ... may not
unreasonably refuse to award an additional competitive
franchise."263 The statute does not explain when it would be unrea
sonable to refuse to award the additional franchise. In light of the
legislative objectives of the Act and the circumstances incident to
the cable industry, it is unreasonable to award. an additional
franchise when conditions exist in a particular case that warrant the
protection of exclusivity, and rebut the presumption of retroactiv
ity. The interest in exclusive cable franchises must therefore be
determined on a case-by-case basis to discern whether the circum
stances in a particular case make it unreasonable to grant an addi
tional competitive franchise. This section briefly outlines several of
the relevant factors to be considered. 264
The date that the preexisting franchise agreement was entered
into is relevant to several considerations. Whether the franchise
was entered into before or after the 1984 Cable Act bears directly
on the issue of the parties' reliance on the law. As noted, the 1984
Cable Act severely circumscribed the regulatory power of franchis
ing authorities.265 The unregulated monopoly enjoyed by many ex
clusive franchisees in the wake of the 1984 Act was a critical factor
in the development of the new consumer protection measures en
acted in the 1992 Act. 266 As such, exclusive franchises granted
prior to 1984 are more likely to enjoy unregulated monopoly condi
tions, and are therefore more likely to be affected by section 541(a).
263. 47 U.S.c. § S41(a)(1) (1994).
264. The section represents factors examined in this Note and is not intended to
be exclusive of other potentially relevant factors. A case-by-case approach to determin
ing the retroactivity of a statute has been adopted in another context by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Henley v. Slone, 961 F.2d 23, 24 (2d
Cir. 1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the
question of whether the federal limitations period for securities fraud claims applied
retroactively. The court held that, under the federal statute, the applicable limitations
period must be determined case-by-case with regard to the law of retroactivity in the
pertinent jurisdiction. Id. at 2S-26. A case-by-case approach to deciding issues involv
ing statutory provisions in general is common in the law. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (motions for transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) require consideration of the facts on a case-by-case basis).
26S. See supra part I.A.4 for a discussion of the effects of the 1984 Cable Act.
266. See supra part I.A.S for a discussion of the·market and regulatory conditions
leading to the 1992 Act.

1996]

A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF PRACTICAL REASON

483

The length of time since the franchise was granted is also rele
vant to whether the franchisee has had an adequate opportunity to
recoup its capital investment, or conversely whether the franchisee
has not yet invested anything substantial enough to warrant protec
tion. Given the large initial capital investment required to con
struct a cable system,267 fairness requires that the franchisee be
given adequate opportunity to realize earnings sufficient to cover
its investment. Otherwise, many smaller cable companies might not
have been willing to risk entering a particular market as they stand
to lose their investment should a larger company decide to enter
the market and compete. Conversely, where an award of a
franchise has been so recent that the franchisee has not yet even
begun to perform-i.e., has not yet invested in building the cable
system-it may not be unreasonable to grant an additional
franchise. 268
The adequacy of consumer service will also be relevant to any
determination of the reasonableness of refusing to grant an addi
tional competitive franchise. The quality of service is particularly
relevant in areas where a single cable provider has enjoyed a mo
nopoly over the market. One of the principal adverse conse
quences resulting from the unregulated market conditions in the
wake of the 1984 Act was the poor quality of consumer services.269
Poor consumer services may be evidenced by the rate of increase in
cable fees and the quality of customer service in general.
The physical capacity of the franchise area to absorb an addi
tional cable system is also relevant to whether a refusal to grant an
267. See supra part I.A.1 for a discussion of the capital intensive nature of the
cable industry.
268. Admittedly, no situation may currently arise under the 1992 Act where there
has been a recent grant of an exclusive franchise, as § 541(a) prohibits granting exclu
sive franchises. See supra note 69 for the text of the statute. However, this factor re
mains relevant in the current context where a franchise has been granted and soon
thereafter a competitor applies for a franchise. Arguably, there is no reason to protect
the first franchisee from the competition of the second where the first has not yet in
vested in the franchise.
On the other hand, the grant of a second competitive franchise may cause
problems in light of the contractual expectations of the first franchisee. For instance, if
the first franchisee is a smaller company and the second franchisee is a national com
pany, the first franchisee may expect the second franchisee to attempt to undersell as a
means of capturing a larger market share. See supra part I.A.!. Rather than building a
cable system only to be subsequently forced out of the market, it would seem likely that
the first franchisee would attempt to reach a rescission agreement with the franchising
authority.
269. See supra part I.A.4 for a discussion of the negative effects of the "undue
market power" possessed by cable franchises.
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additional franchise would be unreasonable. Where the physical in
frastructure of a community cannot support the installation of an
additional cable grid, it would be reasonable to refuse to grant an
additional franchise. 270 A related consideration is the disruptive
ness inherent in installing an additional cable system. This consid
eration is particularly relevant where a community has recently
undergone the disruption of having its streets unearthed and tele
phone lines reconfigured as a result of a new cable system. It would
be arguably unreasonable to expect a community to repeatedly
withstand such disruption within a short time period.
None of the preceding factors are dispositive of whether it
would be unreasonable to grant a second franchise, and the sum
mary given is not exclusive of other potentially relevant factors.
The variance in circumstances from case to case will likely present
an array of relevant factors. Section 541(a) requires that the court
examine and weigh the competing factors present in the particular
case and determine whether refusing to grant an additional
franchise would be unreasonable in light of the general objectives
of the 1992 Act-the promotion of managed competition and the
protection of consumer interests.
CONCLUSION

The Cox and James Cable decisions illustrate the problems in
herent in traditional approaches to statutory construction. While
these courts reached opposite conclusions on the question of the
retroactivity of section 541(a), both courts approached the interpre
tation of the statute with essentially the same traditional methods of
statutory construction. Thus, neither court adequately addressed
the objectives of the statute in light of the historical circumstances
incident to the cable industry, the legislative history, or the underly
ing interests that would be affected by the statute's retroactive
application.
The Landgraf test, relied on by James Cable, similarly ap
proaches the interpretation of statutes with traditional methods of
construction. The question of whether section 541(a) of the 1992
Cable Act applies to preexisting exclusive franchises is not ade
quately resolved by the analytical framework delineated by the
Supreme Court in Landgraf. The Landgraf test for retroactivity
fails to account for relevant policy matters and historical circum
270. See supra note 229 and accompanying text for a discussion of the physical
constraints faced by municipalities in granting additional franchises.
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stances that are crucial to attaining the objectives of the 1992 Act.
Thus, James Cable's application of the Landgraf test resulted in a
decision based on rules, rather than a construction based on the
objectives of the 1992 Cable Act.
An interpretation of the statute based on practical reason ad
dresses the underlying policy concerns of retroactivity in the cable
context, and the legislative objectives of the 1992 Cable Act. This
approach includes an examination of the text, legislative history,
historical development of the cable industry and its regulation, and
the underlying interests effected by a retroactive application of the
statute.
The text of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act demonstrates that the purpose of the Act is to
remedy the situation created by the 1984 Cable Act-unregulated
monopoly. The Act is designed to protect consumer interests
harmed by the effects of unregulated monopoly by promoting man
aged competition. The legislative history illustrates that applying
section 541(a) to negate preexisting exclusive franchises is consis
tent with the purpose of the Act. Thus, a presumption in favor of
retroactive application exists, rebutted when it is unreasonable to
grant a second franchise. Determining when it is unreasonable to
grant a second franchise requires consideration of the effect that
retroactive application will have on the underlying interests in the
particular case, in light of the overall objectives of the Act. This
case-by-case method of analysis under section 541(a) achieves the
objectives of the Act by recognizing and responding to the varia
tions in the cable industry.271
Michael D. Blanchard

271. The necessary question subsequent to any determination that exclusivity
may be retroactively affected involves whether such a retroactive application of the
statute is constitutional on Due Process grounds. This question is beyond the scope of
this Note. However, the district court in Cox determined on remand that § 541(a) does
not violate Due Process. Cox Cable Communications, Inc. v. United States, 866 F.
Supp. 553, 557-58 (M.D. Ga. 1994). Given the relatively low standard of "minimum
scrutiny" review applicable to retroactive application of a statute where economic rights
are affected, it is clear that such retroactive applications will invariably be found consti
tutional. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191-92 (1992).

